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ABSTRACT
This article explores the use of the concept of "mosaics" in individual
rights litigation, a topic that has received virtually no scholarly attention.
Originally a construct used in analysis of intelligence data, the mosaic the-
ory has been transposed to the litigation context and applied in a range of
recent case law. Here, the article examines the theory's use in two settings
that have important implications for individual liberties: to support the
state secrets privilege as a form of information control, and to defeat habe-
as petitions filed by "war on terror" detainees. In these areas, the mosaic
concept is used in two distinct ways: restrictively, to inhibit information de-
velopment by the public, and expansively, to enhance information develop-
ment by the government. These uses of the "mosaic theory" threaten civil
liberties and thwart processes of ensuring executive accountability. Within
the discussed contexts, courts can and should limit the use of the mosaic
theory. Mosaics will likely remain part of the narrative structure of legal
claims and defenses, but the absorption of "mosaic" into the grammar of
executive power should be resisted.
*** Juris doctor, University of Michigan Law School; Ph.D., The New School for Social Research. As-
sociate Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs, Seton Hall University
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INTRODUCTION
When used as a metaphorical or descriptive device,' the term "mosaic"
connotes an intricate, patterned appearance in an artwork or another object.2
Yet, words migrate continually from everyday discourse to the legal lexi-
con, as judges and litigants grasp for ways to articulate new problems or
phenomena. Thus, in the legal context, "mosaic" is sometimes used to de-
4
scribe a complex body of circumstantial evidence. This descriptive usage
evokes an interdependent set of facts, a sum of disparate parts that must be
viewed as a whole in order to make sense. Characterized this way, a plain-
tiff's case presentation might benefit from certain evidentiary rulings that
construe relevancy in a liberal manner. Evidence that seems, on cursory
examination, to lack a nexus with the facts in dispute might be ruled admis-
sible when a court considers its "fit" within a larger mosaic.' Meant in this
sense, a "mosaic" enables understanding of a legal narrative that might oth-
erwise remain elusive. However, there is a danger here. There is always the
risk of slippage in this discursive transposition from the everyday to legal
discourse.
Such slippage is evident in another legal usage of "mosaic" that has de-
veloped over the past three decades in disputes between individuals and the
6federal government. The image of a mosaic is deployed by government
attorneys to rebuff challenges to executive power. Mosaics are used to de-
fend two varieties of state power: the power to keep information secret' and
the power to detain individuals.9 In both cases, the mosaic concept impli-
cates national security: disclosure of information would endanger national
security,'o or the release of a detainee would do so.'' Information control
1 See, e.g., Michael P. GoodwinA ANationa Seurity Puz le: Mosaic Theorv and the First Amendment
Right ofAccess in the Federal Courts, 32 HAS INGS COMM. & ENT, L.J. 179, 185 (2010) (using a mosa-
ic metaphor to describe the government's ability to piece together puzzle pieces)
2 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1778 (3rd ed. 1993).
3 See, e.g., Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 923 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal. 1996) (discussing the general and legal meaning of
"discovery").
4 See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1994).
5 See McGhee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
6 See Goodwin, supra note 1, at 180-81.
7 See generally Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2009).
8 See Kendall W. Harrison, The Evolving Judicial Response to the War on Terrorism, 75 Wis. LAWYER.
14, 17 (Dec. 2002).
9 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 692 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91-92 (D.D.C. 2010).
10 David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115
YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005).
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and detention involve different uses of the mosaic concept. In the case of
information control, mosaics are used restrictively: plaintiffs cannot obtain
the information they seek because it might be part of a larger whole that
ought not be revealed.12 The goal is to restrict someone - the plaintiff, the
public, potential enemies - from developing a body of information. 3 In de-
tention (i.e., habeas corpus) cases, by contrast, the mosaic concept is used
expansively.14 The government seeks to show that certain seemingly mun-
dane bits of information might take on a more sinister cast if imbricated
within a larger mosaic." Here, the government itself is the builder of the
mosaic;16 they want to connect the dots, rather than preventing someone
else from doing it. These two deployments have one very important thing
in common: they both function as a shield against challenges to state power
that is being exercised in fundamentally devastating ways.' An unsuccess-
ful habeas petition results in continued detention at Guantanamo Bay or in a
federal prison." A ruling denying access to information about government
activities can mean the courthouse doors are shut to the plaintiff. ' In one
particular case, such a ruling meant that the plaintiff could not have lifesav-
ing medical information;20 in another, it meant that the plaintiffs were de-
nied knowledge about how their loved ones died; 21 in a third, a torture vic-
tim was left without recourse after being mistakenly seized as a terror
22
suspect, rendered to a secret location, and tortured for months. Given the-
se high stakes, it is worth asking whether the mosaic concept may have ex-
panded past manageable or appropriate boundaries.
As a theoretical matter, the problem resulting from the development of
11 Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 55-56.
12 See C.I.A. v. Simms, 471 U.S. 159, 179 (1985).
13 See Harrison, supra note 8, at 18 (discussing the government's withholding of defendant names and
locations from the public and courts).
14 See Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REV.
845, 864 (2006).
15 Cf Donald F. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Defense, Cable to RUHH subscribers (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
http:/www.fas.org/sgp/news/200301 /dodweb.html (describing al-Qaeda use of government web sites to
gather information)
16 See Walter E. Kuhn, The Terrorist Detention Review Reform Act: Detention Policy and Political Re-
ality, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 221, 243 (2011).
17 Goodwin, supra note 1, at 206-07.
18 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 692 F. Supp. 2d 85, 86 (D.D.C. 2010) (denying the defendant's habeas ap-
peal and continuing imprisonment).
19 See, e.g., Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1989).
20 Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998).
21 U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953).
22 See El-Marsi v. U.S., 479 F.3d 296, 296 (4th Cir. 2007).
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the mosaic concept in secrecy and detention cases is one of limits.23 How
tightly should the mosaic be constructed, or, in a topographical sense, over
what terrain should it extend? Is there any connection that is too remote to
be meaningful? Is there any potential relationship between two facts that is
too attenuated? Once the federal courts accept the mosaic theory as a valid
24legal doctrine (as they have), they must manage it by setting out the pa-
rameters of what constitutes a mosaic. Somewhere between the proposition
that all data points are related (even on some extremely general level) and
the claim that only very closely associated phenomena can be grouped to-
gether, courts must locate their conception of a mosaic.
In addition to these theoretical concerns, there is also a practical prob-
lem: how to limit executive overreach in the face of clear incentives for
abuse. With national security purportedly at issue, courts may see a com-
25 26pelling reason to defer to the executive. 2 As courts accept mosaic claims,
there is more and more reason to assert them. Success in asserting mosaic
claims makes them more attractive; moreover, there is nothing to lose by
raising them.27 To some extent, the mosaic theory tracks the state secrets
privilege, an evidentiary rule created to protect the executive against disclo-
28
sure, in litigation, of information related to national security. Mosaic the-
ory is actually a subset of state secrets claims; not every state secrets asser-
tion relies on the mosaic theory.29 However, in recent years, the mosaic
theory has been used to buttress state secrets claims when the sensitive na-
ture of a particular piece of information is not immediately evident. 30 The
argument goes something like this: "It may not be a secret standing alone,
but it is part of a larger mosaic that ought not be revealed."3
23 See Adam Liptak et al., After Sept. II, A Legal Battle on the Limits of Civil Libertv, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2002, at AI1
2 4 See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (showing how to use the mosaic concept in state
secrets cases).
25 Justice Thomas has stated repeatedly that the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular,
lack the institutional competence to evaluate the executive's conduct in foreign affairs, and the waging
of war in particular. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579-80 (2004) (Thomas, J. dissent-
ing); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 841 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
26 See Pozen, supra note 10, at 651-52.
27 See id. at 633.
28 See U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953) (discussing the "state secret privilege" which will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part 2 of this article).
29 See Michael H. Page, Note, Judging Without the Facts: A Schematic for Reviewing State Secrets
Privilege Claims, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1243, 1252-53 (2008).
30 See N. Jersey Media Grp. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating we should not de-
pend on the judicial view to determine the classification).
31 E.g., Donald F. Rumsfeld, Sec. of Defense, Cable to RUHH subscribers (Jan. 14, 2003), available at
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Part 1 of this article discusses mosaics in three contexts outside of indi-
vidual rights litigation against the federal government. The first of these is
intelligence analysis. The mosaic concept is a heuristic for understanding
the interrelationship of pieces of intelligence.3 2  To be sure, intelligence-
gathering is related to information control and detention; state secrets are
often embedded in intelligence, and detention is sometimes justified by
reference to intelligence data, particularly post-9/1 1.34
The mosaic theory is also relevant in the context of Freedom of Infor-
mation Act ("FOJA") litigation. Here, the mosaic theory is used by the fed-
eral government to build a rationale for withholding documents based on,
but expanding, the statutory exemption categories.
This section will also describe and survey the use of mosaics in Title VII
litigation. There, the admittedly difficult task of proving discriminatory an-
imus is made easier by allowing proofs based on circumstantial evidence to
36be structured under a mosaic theory. This usage bears similarities to the
secrecy and detention cases, 3 but it is distinct because state power is not
facilitated by the use of the mosaic concept. Instead, the private litigant
38benefits from its use.
Part 2 of this article is a discussion of the state secrets privilege as a
means of information control by the executive branch. First, the article
provides a brief overview of the state secrets privilege from its origin in the
http:/www.fas org/sgp/news/2003/01/dodweb.htmi (describing al-Qaeda use of government web sites to
gather information)
32 See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
33 See Anderson Evan Thomas, Note, Remaining Covered By the "Near Blanket" of Deference: Berman
v. Central Intelligence Agency and the ClA's Continual Use of Exemption 3 to Deny FO-14 Requests, 28
MISS. C. L. REV 497, 508 (2009).
34 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 692 F. Supp. 2d 85, 91 (D.D.C. 2010).
35 The Freedom of Information Act and the right of access to the federal courts are the only contexts in
which mosaics have been discussed at length by other commentators. See Goodwin, supra note 1, at
180; Pozen, supra note 10, at 630; see also ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 133-34 (2007); BENJAMIN WITTES, THE EMERGING LAW OF
DETENTION 104 (2011); Bahzer Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the Newt Common Law, of
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 523 (2010).
36 See Sylvester v. SOS Children's Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900, 903 (7th Cir. 2006).
37 Compare Sylvester, 453 F.3d at 903 (allowing "a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence" as
proof of a prima facie case), iv'th AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1220
(D. Or. 2006) (employing mosaic theory as a means of understanding intelligence for decision purpos-
es), and Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing application of mo-
saic theory to a detention case generally).
38 See, e.g., Walker v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisc. Sys., 410 F.3d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 2005) (dis-
cussing the plaintiffs circumstantial evidence under the mosaic theory).
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1953 case of United States v. Reynolds3 through the subsequent half-
century of its development, including the important state secrets rulings fol-
lowing 9/11. Finally, I will explore the use of the mosaic theory in the state
secrets context, showing how it makes that concept even more susceptible
to overuse than it already was. I will detail the sense in which the use of
mosaics in state secrets cases is restrictive: it limits the available infor-
mation from which a mosaic could be constructed.40
Part 3 is a discussion of mosaics in detention cases. All of the cases dis-
cussed arose post-9/11 in the context of the war on terror.4' Once the Su-
preme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantanamo detainees had
42the right to petition the federal courts for writs of habeas corpus, the num-
ber of these petitions multiplied, as did the use of the mosaic theory as a
43
means of defeating such petitions. This was, as suggested above, an ex-
pansive use of the mosaic concept, as it involved the construction of mosa-
ics by the government to justify continued detention. The article will ex-
plain in more detail the meaning of "expansive" use and will survey the
case law on this point.
Part 4 elaborates on restrictive/expansive mosaic building and draws a
contrast between them. There, some of the implications of the use of mosa-
ics are considered in contexts where the phenomenon of "probability ne-
glect" is observable. The mosaic theory is also related to recent scholarly
debates on emergency powers and the "state of exception."
The article concludes with a plea to limit the use of mosaics in individual
rights litigation against the government. Having explained the dangers in-
herent in their use, the article suggests a way out of the dilemmas mosaics
pose. As a creature of case law, mosaic theory can also be tamed by case
law. Judges have, on occasion, recognized that mosaics have very different
39 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
40 See, e.g., Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1162-63 (affirming a case dismissed after all evidence was deemed sub-
ject to state secrets privilege).
41 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733-36 (2008) (discussing generally the post-9/1 I ba-
sis of multiple cases).
42 Id at 798.
43 Tyler L. Sparrow, Note, Indefinite Detention After Boumediene: Judicial Trailblazing in Uncharted
and Unfamiliar Territory, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 261, 264 (2011) ("In the wake of Boumediene, there
has been a flood of litigation in which detainees seek the writ of habeas corpus challenging their deten-
tion as unlawful.").
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implications depending on the contexts in which they are deployed. 44 When
mindful of the threat mosaics pose to individual rights, judges can perform
a crucial limiting role against excessive executive power.
PART 1. THE MOSAIC CONCEPT IN LEGAL DISCOURSE: ORIGINS AND
CONTEXTS
A. Codifications of the Standard
The transposition of mosaics into law was facilitated by several
regulatory developments. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan issued an ex-
ecutive order regarding document classification that stated the mosaic theo-
ry in almost precisely the form in which it is typically applied in case law.45
Additionally, the Navy's federal regulations for FOTA cases state the theo-
46ry. Herbert Foerstel notes that, in addition to Reagan's 1982 Executive
Order, the mosaic theory was codified in Reagan's 1984 National Security
Directive as well as a 1986 Air Force Report on information gathering. 4 It
bears noting that each of these standards governs information control rather
than information analysis. A rationale for why information must be kept
secret tells little about how intelligence conclusions are drawn. As this arti-
cle will reiterate, the building of mosaics and restricting the building of mo-
saics are very different enterprises. Moreover, the determination that in-
formation should be assembled in a certain form, and the decision to
allocate intelligence resources in accordance with that form, can be pursued
with less certainty than court proceedings require.48  Security and intelli-
gence agencies on the one hand, and courts on the other, obviously have
very different institutional mandates, norms, and objectives.49
The role of probability analysis in intelligence gathering, as compared to
evidentiary law, is quite different. What suffices for one purpose does not
necessarily satisfy the other. Addressing this difference in the course of rul-
ing on a habeas corpus petition, Judge Kessler of the D.C. District Court
44 See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (distinguishing appropriate
standards of proof in intelligence from standards in the courtroom).
45 Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1982) (emphasis added), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1982).
4 6 32 C.F.R.§ 701.31 (2011).
47 HERBERT FOERSTEL, FREE EXPRESSION AND CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 148 (1997).
48 See, e.g., McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (distinguishing the standards in
intelligence gathering from the standards in judicial protection of individual rights).
4 9 See Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. at 56.
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distinguished mosaic use in intelligence gathering from its use on the court-
room.50 "The kind and amount of evidence," she wrote, "which satisfies the
intelligence community in reaching final conclusions about the value of in-
formation it obtains may be very different, and certainly cannot govern the
Court's ruling."5
B. The Freedom of Information Act
In a thorough and excellent discussion of the mosaic theory in Freedom
of Information Act ("FOIA")52 cases, David Pozen has explored many of
the dilemmas, theoretical and practical, arising from use of the mosaic as a
jurisprudential concept. For the treatment of FOTA cases in which the
mosaic theory has been raised, this article will refer to Pozen's analysis.
This section will survey contexts in which mosaics have been used, with the
intention merely to indicate the wide-ranging use of the concept rather than
to undertake an exhaustive study of every application. Thus, in addition to
FOTA, this article touches on Title V1154 cases.
There is inevitably some overlap between the state secrets doctrine55
(discussed in Part 2) and FOIA. Both provide a legal basis for government
denial of information to members of the public, and as such they are often
56cited as alternative grounds for denial in the same case. FOTA, of course,
is a statutory creature,5  while state secrets is a common-law evidentiary
privilege,58 and this difference accounts for their somewhat separate history
and development. Nonetheless, they are both addressed in some of the
50 d
51 Jd.
52 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
53 See Pozen, supra note 10, at 668-75.
54 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006).
55 Stated most broadly in Totten v. United States: "It may be stated as a general principle, that public
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court ofjustice, the trial of which would inevitably lead
to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not
allow the confidence to be violated." 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
56 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 144-47 (1981)
(discussing FOTA and state secret rationales for dismissing a case against the Navy).
57 FOTA's "Exemption 7" protects classified documents from disclosure and is the basis, for example,
for the denial of information in The National Security Studies case. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 98 (D.D.C. 2002), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 331 F.3d 918
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
58 See U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (discussing the privilege as "well established in the law
of evidence.").
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same cases.
Pozen delineates three categories of judicial behavior when courts up-
60hold FOJA denials: delegation, abdication, and deference. In delegation
mode, courts leave agency oversight to the agencies themselves,61 while ab-
dication leads the courts to decline to review secrecy claims at all.62 Final-
ly, deference aligns FOJA review with other national security-related litiga-
tion in which the courts prefer to leave the executive to deal with matters
uniquely within its expertise - if the courts are going to review, it will not
63be a searching or substantive review. All of these categories move courts
away from a scrutinizing role in FOTA challenges, and therefore they en-
courage overuse of the mosaic rationale for denying information to the pub-
lic.64
The Bush administration's more aggressive approach to information con-
trol65 led it to deny more FOJA requests, and in turn to use the mosaic theo-
66
ry more frequently as a means to do so. This development was part of a
67
general trend of increased secrecy during the Bush years. This trend in-
cluded not only increased document classification and FOJA denials, but
also anti-terror programs, the state secrets privilege, executive privilege and
national security surveillance.68 Viewed together, these secrecy-related
techniques can be seen to afford the executive greater institutional power in
combination than they do separately:69 for instance, anti-terror programs
can operate in greater secrecy because of the state secrets privilege. The se-
crecy-power nexus will be discussed in greater detail in Part 2.
59 See, e.g., Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Dept. of Def Through Def Logistics Agency, 831 F.2d 441,
445 (3d Cir. 1987) (discussing Department of Defense mosaic theory argument as a FOTA request).
60 Pozen, supra note 10, at 652.
61 Jd
62 Jd
63 Id. Justice Thomas' Hamdan dissent articulates this "deference" rationale. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 678 (2006) (Thomas, J., Dissenting) ("The plurality's evident belief that it is qualified to pass
on the "military necessity" . . . of the Commander in Chiefs decision to employ a particular form of
force against our enemies is so antithetical to our constitutional structure that it simply cannot go unan-
swered. I respectfully dissent.").
64 See Pozen, supra note 10, at 654.
65 See id at 63 1.
66 Jd
67 Jd
68 PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 35, at 81-82.
69 See id. at 83.
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C. Title VII Cases
The mosaic concept has been used to evaluate plaintiffs' evidentiary
presentations in Title VII employment discrimination cases.70 In Walker v.
Board ofRegents, for example, the Seventh Circuit explained,
[c]ircumstantial evidence, by contrast, does not directly demonstrate discrimi-
natory intent but supports an inference of such intent under the circumstances.
We have identified three types of circumstantial evidence relevant to Title VII
discrimination cases. The first is "suspicious timing, ambiguous statements
oral or written, behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the
protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discrimi-
natory intent might be drawn" The key consideration is the totality of these
"pieces of evidence[,] none conclusive in itself but together composing a con-
vincing mosaic of discrimination against the plaintiff."7
The Walker case involved a university administrator who alleged that she
72
was dismissed from her position for discriminatory reasons. The jury
found in her favor on the gender discrimination claim, but the trial judge
overturned the verdict. The court used the mosaic concept there to evalu-
ate whether, in the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory conduct,
"bits and pieces" of evidence might establish discrimination.74 The material
from which this mosaic would be constructed was "alleged inconsistencies
in Markee's statements and meeting notes." However, the reviewing
court found this evidence to amount to nothing more than a "litany of factu-
al quibbles."76 Thus, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment
in favor of the employer.
In Petts v. Rockledge Furniture, the Seventh Circuit elaborated further
on the precise way in which the mosaic concept could be used in employ-
70 See, e.g., Kozuszek v. Brewer, 546 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2008); Jamerson v. Milwaukee Cnty. Pro-
curement Div., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42245, at *26 (E.D. Wis. 2006), aff'd sub nom Jamerson v. Ryan,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 28495 (7th Cir. Wis., Nov. 15, 2006); Walker v. Bd. of Regents, 410 F.3d 387,
394 (7th Circuit 2005).
71 Walker, 410 F.3d at 394.
72 Jd at 389.
73 d
74 d at 394.
7 Jd at 396-97.
76 Jd.
7 Walker, 410 F.3d at 396-97.
78 Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d. 715 (7th Cir. 2008).
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ment discrimination cases. 9 Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination,so but
the trial judge granted summary judgment to the defendant." Though the
terminology is somewhat confusing, the evidentiary standard allows proof
of discriminatory intent through various forms of circumstantial evidence.8 2
For instance, Petts reported certain remarks made by two male managers
that, she claimed, revealed those managers' negative attitudes toward wom-
en. The Seventh Circuit disagreed with Plaintiff regarding the signifi-
cance of the managers' remarks, indicating that they were at least ambigu-
ous with regard to their meaning.8 4 Thus, the court ruled, there had indeed
been insufficient evidence to put the case before a jury, and therefore sum-
mary judgment was appropriate."
These two cases from the employment discrimination context show the
courts' willingness to consider a mosaic-type presentation of evidence as a
86
means of proving plaintiff's case. The place of the "mosaic" in the case
law evidentiary standard is clear as well: intent can be proven through a
composite of circumstantial evidence. In both Walker and Petts, the re-
viewing court and the trial court agreed that such a composite had not been
successfully constructed; i.e., that the plaintiff failed to carry the burden.
The court was willing to consider the evidence, but found it lacking in ma-
teriality. 9 Though the competent nature of the evidence and the standard
were clear, the court was not persuaded as to its import.90
To a lesser extent, the mosaic construct appears in the criminal context as
well, particularly in appeals of sentencing and post-conviction review;
7 9 d at 720-21.
8 0 d at 717.
81 Jd
8 2 d at 720-21.
8 3 d at 719-20.
84 Petts, 534 F.3d. at 721-23.
85 Jd at 727.
86 Walker, 410 F.3d at 394; Petts, 534 F.3d at 720.
87 Walker, 410 F.3d at 394; Petts, 534 F.3d at 720.
88 Walker, 410 F.3d at 389; Petts, 534 F.3d at 717.
89 Walker, 410 F.3d at 396-97; Petts, 534 F.3d at 727.
90 Walker, 410 F.3d at 396-97; Petts, 534 F.3d. 715, 727. For other Title VII cases using the mosaic
theory, see Harris v. Warrick Cnty. Sheriffs Dept., 666 F. 3d 444, 447 (7th Cir. 2012) (summary judg-
ment for employer); Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing summary
judgment for employer); Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011) (revers-
ing summary judgment for employer); Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir.
2011).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Faulkenberry, 461 Fed. App'x 496, 502-03 (6th Cir. 2012) (sentencing
analysis described as mosaic); United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2009) (sentencing
analysis described as mosaic); United States v. Hertular, 562 F.3d 433, 446 (2d Cir. 2009) (sentencing
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however, because this usage pertains specifically to the sentencing judge's
weighing of sentencing factors,92 it is difficult to generalize about how the
mosaic concept is applied there.
II. THE MOSAic THEORY IN STATE SECRETS LITIGATION
A. An Overview of the State Secrets Privilege
The state secrets privilege is a common-law doctrine that the federal
courts apply when the government claims that a litigant's demand for a par-
ticular piece of information would endanger national security if granted.
An assertion of the state secrets privilege virtually always leads to the deni-
al of the demand for information.94 Additionally, the privilege can be used
to gain dismissal of an entire case.9' In an increasing number of cases, the
government seeks dismissal of a lawsuit outright on state secrets grounds,
asserting that the very subject-matter of the lawsuit is a state secret, and
therefore allowing the suit to go forward would threaten national security,
96irrespective of the privileged status of any particular document.
Although there are antecedents in English law9 and in earlier legal dis-
putes in the United States," the first explicit pronouncement of the modern
state secrets privilege was made in the 1953 case of United States v. Reyn-
olds.99 Reynolds involved the crash of a military plane in which several
U.S. military service members were killed. 00 The victims' families sought
information from the Air Force regarding the crash; specifically, they want-
ed accident reports filed as a matter of course following any such accident
analysis described as mosaic); United States v. Bourgeois, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55859 (S.D. Tex.
2011) (post-conviction review analyzes defendant's social history as mosaic).
92 See, e.g., Rigas, 583 F. 3d at 118-19.
93 See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 35, at 86.
94 Jd at 87.
95 See id
96 See id at 89.
9 See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCL Q.
85, 97 (2005).
98 Id at 94
99 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953). For a discussion of the state secrets privilege
and its origins in English law, see Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 97, at 97-101 (2005). On the state se-
crets privilege generally, see D.A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the Courts Can
(and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMPLE L. REV. 499 (2007); Robert M. Chesney, State
Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249 (2007); Amanda
Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2007).
100 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
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.101 The government denied this request and the families filed suit.102 When
the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the Court ruled in favor
of the government,103 and declared that the state secrets privilege is availa-
ble to the executive to prevent disclosure of information to a private litigant
when "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will ex-
pose matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be di-
vulged."104
This ruling was extremely consequential. Once Reynolds was handed
down, it provided an explicit Supreme Court precedent stating that the state
secrets privilege was available to the executive branch, along with instruc-
tive language from the Court indicating that deference must be shown to the
executive once the privilege is asserted.1os Executive privilege, which ap-
plies in non-national security matters, was already available,106 but the state
secrets privilege went further.10' A new, separate and very powerful tool
for protecting executive branch information stood ready for use with little,
if any, limitation.
In a troubling and ironic postscript to the Reynolds decision, the formerly
"secret" information surfaced on the internet decades later.10s The accident
report, as it turned out, contained nothing sensitive or national security-
related, but instead was a rather mundane listing of the facts of the crash.1o,
Thus, the case that founded the modern state secrets doctrine in the United
States did not actually contain any state secrets. An attempt to correct the
record in Reynolds, via a writ of error in coram nobis, was unavailing."i0
The state secrets doctrine, then, has been tainted by government misconduct
from its very birth.
101 See LouIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND
THE REYNOLDS CASE 3 (2006). Louis Fisher has traced the Reynolds case from its beginnings through
the 1990s and has shown that the state secrets privilege was improperly used there. See generally id.
102 Jd
103 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5, 12.
104 Id. at 10.
105 Id. at 10- 11.
106 Louis FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 3 (2004). Executive privilege is a separate
doctrine that protects the confidential nature of presidential communications. It is qualified privilege,
while state secrets privilege is absolute. In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court distinguished the-
se two distinct privileges. 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). For additional commentary on executive privilege,
see generally id; MARK ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2002).
107 FISHER, supra note 106, at 167
108 Jd
109 Id. at 177.
110 In re Herring, 539 U.S. 940 (2003).
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In the 1974 case of United States v. Nixon,"' the Court clarified the dif-
ference between the more limited executive privilege (which protects confi-
dential communications between the president and advisors)112 and the state
secrets privilege. Nixon had tried unsuccessfully to conflate the two, claim-
ing an unlimited privilege for all presidential communications. On one
hand, the Court's disentanglement of the two privilege doctrines was an
important limitation of presidential power: it brought down a president. 11 4
Yet, as Louis Fisher pointed out, United States v. Nixon also facilitated state
secrets claims by suggesting that a case involving military secrets might be
treated with much greater deference."
The overbroad and ill-advised doctrine imported in Reynolds has grown
up to cause problems for litigants and the federal courts themselves for
more than fifty years.1 6 Commentators' claims of inherent and/or unre-
viewable executive power in the national security or foreign policy context
compound the error, for they create an appearance of legitimacy for the ex-
ercise of a powerful tool of executive secrecy.'" Problems arise as courts
struggle to adjudicate an ever-expanding variety of state secrets claims,' 8
and these problems have been compounded by the acceptance and devel-
opment of mosaic-type arguments in this context. This section will ex-
plain briefly some of the main components of the state secrets privilege as it
is applied in the federal courts today, and will highlight some of the case
law developments that have sometimes made the doctrine unmanageable.
Finally, it will indicate the ways in which the mosaic theory is used in the
state secrets context and outline the further problems that mosaics have
posed for state secrets jurisprudence.
B. The Three Applications of the Privilege
By the late 1 990s, federal courts were applying a three-part analysis in
state secrets cases,120 or more accurately, they were applying the privilege
111 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
112 Id at 706.
113 Id at 686.
114 ROZELL, supra note 106, at 70.
115 See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Invoking Executive Privilege: Navigating Ticklish Political Waters, 8 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 583, 602 (2000).
116 See FISHER, supra note 106, at 254.
117 John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 591 (2006)
118 See FISHER, supra note 106, at 245
119 See, e.g., Kaszav. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (embracing a mosaic argument).
120 See Jared Perkins, The State Secrets Privilege and the Abdication of Oversight, 21 BYU J. PUB. L.
235, 243 (2007).
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in one of three ways.121 Of course, government defendants modified their
motion practice accordingly by seeking relief via summary judgment or
dismissal as appropriate.122 There are three potential avenues by which the
federal government can apply the state secrets doctrine to end a lawsuit. 123
In the first class of cases ("Alternative One"), the privileged material is
removed from the case, and the matter goes forward without it.124  If the
plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case because the necessary evidence
is unavailable due to privilege, the case will be dismissed.125  The second
class of cases ("Alternative Two") arises when the defendant (usually the
federal government) cannot present a valid defense without the protected
material.126 Perceiving that the defendant is caught between the need to
guard state secrets on the one hand and the need to avoid legal liability on
the other, courts will grant summary judgment to the defendant in such in-
stances. 12 In both Alternative One and Alternative Two, termination by
dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate, but some discovery is often
necessary in order for the court to determine that the plaintiff or defendant
lacks the necessary evidence to prove the case or defend itself 128 The third
variety of state secrets case ("Alternative Three") occurs when the very sub-
ject matter of the case is a state secret, so that it is impossible even to dis-
cuss the allegations in the complaint without implicating protected (i.e.,
privileged) material.129 In such cases, the appropriate disposition is to dis-
miss the case at the outset.130
A related but distinct means of terminating state secrets-related litigation
involves the so-called "Totten bar," which was recently utilized in Tenet v.
Doe.'3  Totten applies in cases where a claim against the United States is
based on a secret relationship between plaintiff and government.132 In such
The steps to be followed in all state secrets cases are the same initially. The court must first determine
whether the privilege has been properly asserted by the correct person in the right way, and once that
inquiry is satisfied it is appropriate to move on to evaluating the actual substantive content ofthe asser-
tion. El-Masri v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 536 (E.D. Va. 2006).
122 FISHER, supra note 106, at 245.
123 See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166.
124 Jd.
12 Jd.
126 Jd.
127 See, e.g., Molerio v. F.B.I., 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
128 See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166.
129 Jd.
1 See Hepting v. AT&T, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d
1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998)).
1 Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10 (2005).
132 Jd. at 7-8.
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cases, an implied covenant of silence applies between the parties.1 Totten
creates a categorical bar to suit: the plaintiff is barred from recovery be-
cause of the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the case is
dismissed.134 The result is the same as that of Alternative Three - dismissal
at the outset - but Totten encompasses a specific type of dispute based on a
confidential contractual relationship. 3 5
i. NSA Wiretapping
Of course, the question of what test applies to a certain case is often de-
terminative of the ultimate outcome of that case. Often, the government
presents the state secrets' tests in the alternative.136 National Security Ad-
ministration ("NSA") wiretapping litigation is an area in which the U.S.
government has advanced all three alternatives of the state secrets privilege,
arguing that each one by itself constituted a reason to dismiss the action.3
The cases arose when the New York Times published a story late in 2005
describing a program of warrantless government wiretapping of certain
overseas telephone calls. 1' The Bush administration admitted publicly that
it had, in fact, been monitoring some overseas telephone calls since 2002.
Allegations also arose concerning a second eavesdropping program, which
involved telephone record collection via a diversion of call data as calls
passed through telecommunications facilities.140 This second program was
not publicly acknowledged by the government.141
In applying the state secrets doctrine after the privilege has been asserted,
courts exercise discretion to say which alternative of the privilege, if any,
applies.142 In Hepting v. AT&T Corp., the trial court decided that the sub-
133 See id at 7.
134 See id
135 See generally Totten v. U.S., 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
136 See, e.g., El-Aasri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 538-39.
" See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., at 18, 437 F. Supp.
2d 970 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C-06-0672-VRW).
" James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2005, at Al.
139 Jd.
140 See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USATODAY, May 11,
2006, at 1A.
141 Jd.
142 See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (discussing cases dismissed
under the state secrets privilege).
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ject matter of the case, i.e., the question of "whether AT&T intercepted and
disclosed communications or communications records to the government,"
was not a "secret." 4 3 At this initial stage, the court looked to the public
record, and specifically to statements made by governmental sources,144
reasoning that secrecy protection need not be applied to facts once the gov-
ernment itself had already publicly acknowledged them.145 The government
argued that the subject matter of the case was, in fact, a secret, and it char-
acterized the subject matter (in a somewhat circular fashion) as a secret
government program or programs.146 Yet, the court shifted its focus to con-
sider what was already publicly known and therefore not secret, carving out
an area of non-secret facts that could be litigated without secrecy limita-
tions. 14
The Hepting opinion came at an early stage in the litigation, and of
course it left open the possibility that dismissal at a later point based on
state secrets might be ordered. 14 The ruling is significant, however, as an
attempt to think through and apply limits to the secrecy power that flows
from the state secrets doctrine.
The NSA wiretapping litigation has produced a number of court opin-
ions.149 In Terkel v. AT&T, the plaintiffs focused on only one of the two al-
leged wiretapping activities widely reported in the media: the collection of
massive amounts of caller records.150 In Hepting, by contrast, both surveil-
lance programs described above were at issue.' 5' In addition to the collec-
tions of customer records by AT&T, Hepting challenged the content moni-
toring of overseas phone calls,152 which the court found was publicly known
and therefore not a secret. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Walker re-
lied on the president's acknowledgement that the NSA had in fact, moni-
tored overseas calls.154 Although Judge Walker declined to dismiss the case
on state secrets grounds, he noted that the record-collecting program, in
143 d. at 994.
144 Jd at 986.
145 Jd. at 988-89.
146 Jd at 994.
147 Jd at 994.
148 See Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 995.
149 See generally Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'1 Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich.
2006); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d 974.
1 Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 900.
151 Hepting, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
152 Jd. at 992.
153 Jd. at 994.
154 Jd. at 996.
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contrast to the content-monitoring program, had not been publicly acknowl-
edged by the government or by AT&T, and therefore it was still a secret
whose disclosure could possibly harm national security.'
Seizing on this distinction between content monitoring and record collec-
tion, the trial judge in Terkel concluded that since the case before him con-
cerned only record collecting - a program whose existence was still
unacknowledged - he was compelled to dismiss the case under Alternative
Three of the state secrets doctrine,156 as described above; i.e., the court
could not go forward at all in a case where the very subject matter involved
state secrets. No discovery could be allowed, the court concluded, without
endangering national security.' In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge
viewed classified declarations and other information as well, which was not
disclosed to the plaintiffs."' The court also produced a "secret" opinion as
part of its ruling, but only the government attorneys were permitted to see
this classified memorandum. 9
The court considered other possible means of proceeding with discov-
ery,160 but it rejected those alternatives, finding that because "the infor-
mation at issue is unavailable in its entirety," there was no way to separate
releasable from non-releasable information. 161 Thus, the Terkel court took
the harshest route available under state secrets law and dismissed the case at
the pleadings stage.162
In ACLU v. National Security Agency, filed in federal court in Detroit, a
different result was reached at the motion to dismiss/summary judgment
stage.163 There, the named plaintiffs claimed they were hampered in their
work and incurred additional expense as a result of the NSA content moni-
toring of overseas telephone communications.164 Thus, the complaint fo-
cused on the content-based wiretapping, determined by the court in Hepting
to be publicly acknowledged and therefore not a secret. The trial judge
granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the content-
155 Jd at 997.
156 Terkel, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
157 d. at 915-16.
158 Jd at 917.
Sd. at 902.
160 d. at 917-18.
.d. at 918.
162 Terkel, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
" Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
164 d. at 765.
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monitoring claim,16 but dismissed the record-monitoring claim (which she
termed "data-mining") on state-secrets grounds, just as the court in Terkel
had done.166 All three opinions produced in the NSA wiretapping litigation
grapple with the problem of evaluating plaintiffs' claims in the face of
forceful and comprehensive invocation of the state secrets privilege. 67The
courts reviewed classified declarations, and to differing extents, actual sub-
stantive evidence, and found that some claims would likely be dismissed
because they risked revealing state secrets.168 Hepting and ACLU, though
decided provisionally in the plaintiffs' favor, nonetheless suggested that the
subject matter of some claims constituted a state secret.169 The broad defi-
nition of state secrets set forth in Reynolds constrained the courts in their
attempts to adjudicate the plaintiffs' substantive claims of government mis-
conduct.' 0
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008 ("Telecom Immunities Act") unsettled the legal ground under the
NSA wiretapping suits by protecting telecom companies from suit and au-
thorizing warrantless wiretapping that had been prohibited by the previous
FISA law.' ' Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush172 was one of the
many lawsuits' brought against the Bush administration warrantless sur-
veillance activities conducted by the NSA in cooperation with various tele-
communications providers.174 Al-Haramain continued beyond the passage
of the telecom immunities law.1' In response to the suit, the Bush admin-
istration sought dismissal, arguing that the very "subject matter" of the suit
- the domestic spying program - was a state secret.176 Working through its
analysis of the state secrets doctrine as applied to the case, the district court
stated that "[c]ourts have recognized that there are inherent limitations in
165 Id. at 782.
1 Id.
167 See generally Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754; Hepting 439 F. Supp. 2d 974; Terkel,
441 F. Supp. 2d 899.
168 See generally Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754; Hepting 439 F. Supp. 2d 974; Terkel,
441 F. Supp. 2d 899.
169 See Am. Civil Liberties Union, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782; Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 996-97.
170 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
171 50 U.S.C. § 1885-85c. The ACLU challenged the law and their case was dismissed, then reinstated
in Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011).
172 AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d. 1215 (D. Or. 2006).
173 See, e.g., In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litigation, 671 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2011).
174 Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 138.
175 The Telecom Immunities Act was passed in 2008, and while Al-Haramain was filed in 2006, it con-
tinued through 2011.
176 AlHaramain, 451 F. Supp. 2d. at 1224-25.
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trying to separate classified and unclassified information, comparing con-
temporary electronic intelligence gathering to the construction of a 'mosa-
ic,' from which pieces of 'seemingly innocuous information' can be ana-
lyzed and cobbled together to reveal the full operational picture."' The
district court (following the lead of other courts construing the mosaic theo-
ry)"' considered the possibility that it would not be able to allow access to
some evidence without implicating other pieces of evidence that should not
be disclosed."' Here, the mosaic metaphor begins to break down, as the
court talks simultaneously about the picture drawn by the intelligence (i.e.
wiretapping) program and the possibility that others could build a mosaic
once the information became available.180 At its root, this argument is
about restricting mosaic construction by the wider public, even though the
court does not explicitly say so. Nonetheless, in the end the court did not
find it impossible to disentangle the privileged from non-privileged infor-
mation, at least at that early stage.'"' There was enough information about
the surveillance program in the public domain that the program's existence
was no longer a state secret.182 Thus, the district court denied the govern-
ment's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit.'
83
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal, declining to dismiss the suit based
on the state secrets privilege. 8 4 As explained above, the privilege can af-
fect a suit in one of several ways. If the Totten bar applies,"' the suit is
precluded. If the "very subject matter" is a state secret, the case must be
dismissed at the outset.186 Otherwise, discovery proceeds and the court
must determine whether each side can present its case once the privileged
evidence has been removed from the case. Here, then, the court left the ap-
plication of the privilege to the discovery stage, leaving open the possibility
that some evidence would be unavailable, or that the entire suit would be
dismissed, as discovery proceeded."' But extensive public disclosures had
vitiated the "secret" status of the surveillance program such that the entire
177 Jd at 1220.
178 See, e.g., Kaszav. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998).
179 Al Haramain, 451 F. Supp. 2d. at 1220.
180 Jd. at 1220-21.
181 Jd at 1223.
182 Jd at 1222.
183 Jd at 1225.
184 Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F. 3d 1190, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2007).
185 See Part 2.B.
186 Jd.
187 Al-Haramain, 507 F. 3d at 1204.
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program could not be considered a secret tout court.
Remarkably, the plaintiffs were ultimately able to successfully prove
their case at the summary judgment stage in district court."'9 The Obama
administration continued the Bush administration's posture in Al-Haramain
and sought dismissal.190 The case was consolidated with other related cas-
es' 9' and heard in the Northern District of California, where the trial judge
held that the plaintiffs met their burden of proof on summary judgment by
means of non-privileged evidence alone.192 The Ninth Circuit reversed in
part, finding Section 2 of the Telecom Immunities Act constitutional.
Nonetheless, the ruling is consequential because it demonstrates that a trial
judge can segregate secret from non-secret material and allow a case to pro-
ceed (at least to summary judgment) on the non-secret evidence alone.
Government arguments about the national security risks of disclosing secret
information are always made prospectively: 194 "If we release X document, it
could create Y security risk in the future." Similarly, the prospective argu-
ment about trial management would be: "We will not be able to separate the
material in this case, so the trial cannot proceed." Once there has been a
trial (or, in this case, a showing upon motion for summary judgment), those
claims become more difficult to make, both now and in the future. The
record is created; the disclosures are not potential but actual; the record can
be assessed on its own terms. Though the government will fight this estab-
lishment of precedent vigorously, the turn of events by which the telecom
records case reached the decision stage is highly significant for state secrets
law.
ii. Extraordinary Rendition
Another set of cases arising out of the "war on terror"1' has been affect-
1 8 Id. at 1197-98.
189 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
190 In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
191 See In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892, 896 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
192 See In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 700 F. Supp. 2d. 1182, 1194-1202 (N.D.
Cal. 2010), rev'd in part, 671 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2011).
193 See generally In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 671 F.3d 881.
194 See, e.g., Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d. at 1220; Kasza v. Browner, 133
F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998).
195 This term was originally coined by President George W. Bush shortly after the terrorist attacks of
9/11/2001. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Bazinet, "A Fight Vs. Evil, Bush and Cabinet Tell U.S," DAILY
NEWS WASHINGTON BUREAU (Sept. 17th, 2001), available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20100505200651/http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/2001/09/17/2
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ed by the state secrets privilege as well. In two recent lawsuits, litigants
challenged the practice of "extraordinary rendition," by which the United
States government apprehends individuals and sends them to other coun-
tries where they are interrogated and tortured.196 Maher Arar, a Canadian
national, alleged that United States officials detained him during a stopover
in Kennedy Airport in New York, flew him to Syria on a secret, private jet,
and delivered him to Syrian officials who interrogated and tortured him.'
Similarly, Khaled El-Masri, a German national, claimed that he was seized
at the Serbian/Macedonian border and sent to a CIA-run facility in Afghani-
stan, where he was held for four months in a case of mistaken identity, and
finally released to a roadside in Albania.1'9 Arar raised claims under the
Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA")'99 as well as Bivens2 00-type due
process claims. The court was able to dispose of the TVPA count without
reference to state secrets by finding that there is no private cause of action
under that law.20' Similarly, the court dismissed the due process claims
202plaintiff raised pursuant to Bivens. Because there were foreign affairs as-
pects of the alleged rendition program, the court found that it "should not,
in the absence of explicit direction by Congress, hold officials who carry
out such policies liable for damages even if such conduct violates our treaty
obligations or customary international law." That was a matter for the
204
political branches to resolve2. Thus, the question of remedy was framed
as a political question of separation of powers rather than ajusticiable ques-
tion of individual rights.205 The fourth count, which involved government
actions on U.S. soil, was dismissed without prejudice, so that Arar could re-
plead it "without regard to any rendition claim."206 Count Four could then
001-09-17_a fight vsevil bush and c.html.
. For a description and analysis of the "extraordinary rendition" program, see generally William
Weaver & Robert Pallitto, Extraordinary Rendition and Presidential Fiat, 36 PRESIDENTIAL
SUMMARIES Q. 102 (2006). See also N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. for Human Rights & Global Justice,
TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY
RENDITIONS" (2004), available at http://www.chrgj.org/docs/TortureByProxy.pdf; Jane Mayer, Annals
of Justice: Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER (Feb. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050214fa fact6.
. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
. EI-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 532-34 (E.D. Va. 2006).
. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2006).
200 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
20 Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 266.
202 Id. at 283.
J0 d.
204 Jd
205 Jd
20 Id. at 287.
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be litigated apart from state secrets, simply as a matter of the conduct of
U.S. officials in the limited timeframe of Arar's airport detention.
E1-Masri brought a Bivens-type claim for violation of due process as well
as two claims under the Alien Tort Statute. 207 The government responded
to his suit by asserting the state secrets privilege208 and submitting an ex
parte classified declaration in support of its claim of privilege (in addition
to a public declaration).209 The court did not, of course, disclose the con-
tents of the government's secret declaration, but relied on the public decla-
ration to say that "any admission or denial of these allegations by defend-
ants in this case would reveal the means and methods employed pursuant to
this clandestine program and such a revelation would present a grave risk of
injury to national security." 2 10 Thus, the court concluded that the very sub-
ject matter of the suit was a state secret, and therefore it could not pro-
211
ceed2. Only dismissal could prevent public disclosure of the secrets in-
212
volved. The court also noted that even if there existed, as the plaintiffs
claimed, "public affirmation of the existence of a rendition program" 2 13 by
the government, the state secrets privilege would still operate with undimin-
ished force because "operational details . . . are validly claimed as state se-
crets." 2 14 The court dismissed the complaint, finding that "well-established
and controlling legal principles require that in the present circumstances,
E1-Masri's private interests must give way to the national interest in pre-
serving state secrets."2 15 In short, Alternative Three described above was
applied to dismiss El Masri's complaint before any discovery could take
place. Obviously, that avenue of resolution was best for the government
defendants, as it always is, because it precluded all discovery. One striking
feature of the court's articulation of the state secrets privilege in El-Masri is
that the "national interest" trumps individual claims, and that the national
216interest is determined solely and unreviewably by the executive.
The allegation that the United States operates an "extraordinary rendi-
207 See El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 534-35 (E.D. Va. 2006).
208 Id at 535.
SId. at 537.
21Jd.
211 See id at 538-39 (citing Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 348 (4th Cir. 2005)).
See id at 539.
213 El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
214 Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
216 See id. at 536.
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tion" program21 raises obvious questions about the extent of executive
power. As alleged, the program operates without treaty support, in viola-
tion of international human rights standards, as well as outside the contours
of constitutional rights in the United States legal system, and it therefore
raises serious questions of legality. 218 Yet the courts confronting these alle-
gations have assumed away the problem by stating, in a conclusory way,
that the "national interest" requires extraordinary rendition, or that separa-
tion of powers precludes further review. 219 The invocation of state secrets
becomes a substitute for analysis as to how government powers and func-
tions are actually divided, and the question whether rights were violated
goes begging. The dismissals of both Arar220 and El-Masri221 were af-
firmed on appeal.
C. Litigation Management Issues
When the Supreme Court handed down its Reynolds decision in 1953,
changes loomed on the national political horizon that would soon affect the
work of federal courts drastically. The Court could not realistically have
foreseen the greatly increased involvement of the federal courts, both in
numbers and complexity, that would come in the 1960s with the implemen-
222tation of the landmark desegregation case, Brown v. Board of Education.
Federal lawsuits on the civil side "dramatically increased in the 1960s."223
224Massive resistance by southern states and municipalities, as well as en-
trenched patterns of segregation, compelled the federal courts to remain in-
volved in protracted litigation that lasted as long as fifty years in one deseg-
225
regation case2. Class action suits became both more common and more
complex in the second half of the twentieth century, and the courts' tech-
226
niques of case management in turn grew more sophisticated. As one
217 See id at 538.
218 See generally id at 538-39.
219 El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 539.
220 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F. 3d 559, 563-64 (2d Cir. 2009).
221 See El-Marsi v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007).
2 22 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 See David. S. Clark, From Administration to Adjudication: A Statistical Analysis of the Federal Dis-
trict Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 93 (1981); see also Lawrence Friedman,
Litigation and Society, 15 ANN. REV. SOCIOLOGY 17, 22 (1989).
224 See generally Steve Barnes, Federal Supervision of Race in Little Rock Schools Ends, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/24/education/24deseg.html.
22 See id
226 See Clark, supra note 223, at 92-93.
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commentator puts it, "[p]ublic law litigation moves the trial judge into an
active role in managing and shaping the typical class action suit." 2 27 Reyn-
olds was decided a year before Brown, and in the ensuing years the state se-
crets privilege outstripped the form in which it arose in Reynolds. More
than just a reason for terminating litigation through dismissal or summary
judgment, it led courts into management decisions about how far litigation
should proceed, and in what form.228 Complex federal litigation over civil
rights, 22 9 federal tort claiMS230 and other disputes proliferated, spanning
years, or decades in some cases. Discovery masters were used in some cas-
es to manage discovery. The basic outlines of state secrets practice an-
nounced in Reynolds were inadequate to address the multiplicity of discov-
ery issues that arose in the litigation explosion of the latter half of the
century.
The Reynolds opinion contains an oft-cited statement on litigation man-
agement, specifically concerning the question of courts' power to order in
camera examination of documents:
Judicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the
caprice of executive officers . . . Yet we will not go so far as to say that the
court may automatically require a complete disclosure to the judge before
231the claim of privilege will be accepted in any case.
The practical result of this language in the foundational Reynolds opinion
has been the instantiation of an unclear standard (which often amounts to no
standard, really) for when and how courts should conduct in camera docu-
ment inspection.232 As of 2005, "[i]n less than one-third of the reported
cases in which the privilege [had] been invoked [had] the courts required in
camera inspection of documents, and they [had] only required such inspec-
tion five times out of the twenty-three reported cases since the presidency
of George H.W. Bush."233 To be sure, actual document inspection is still
relatively unusual, but it has become common practice for trial courts to
view classified government declarations in private, and then to accept the
assertion of the state secrets privilege based on those classified statements
SId. at 93.
228 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 97, at 103.
229 See Goodwin, supra note 1, at 191-92.
230 See Friedman, supra note 223, at 22-24.
2 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
232 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 97, at 101.
23Jd.
2013] 403
404 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XVI:ii
alone. 4  In effect, the declaration substitutes for more substantive evi-
dence. In some instances, such as the El-Masri and Terkel cases, the gov-
ernment submits two declarations: one classified and the other unclassi-
235fied. When the court relies on the classified document, no details are
provided, and judicial discretion has been employed in an unreviewable
fashion. In 2006, Judge Walker issued an opinion in Hepting v. AT&T that
permitted the litigation to proceed, over the government's motion for dis-
missal, but only provisionally.236 The court left open the possibility that
dismissal or summary judgment might be appropriate at a later stage.
Walker also made suggestions regarding the handling of document inspec-
tion and other discovery issues.237 His response to executive secrecy in liti-
gation was appealed by the government, and the appeal relied, predictably,
on Reynolds. Litigation management issues create dilemmas (and ap-
peals)239 for trial judges seeking to do justice to the parties' claims in secre-
cy-related cases.
D. State Secrets in Private Litigation
Another issue not contemplated in Reynolds is the use of the state secrets
privilege in private litigation. Given the contours of the modern state se-
crets privilege, it is typically envisioned as a defense raised by the federal
240government in federal lawsuits against government defendants2. Indeed,
that was how the issue arose in Reynolds, and in subsequent, well-known
cases such as Kasza v. Browner, Halkin v. Helms, and Ellsberg v. Mitch-
ell.24/ However, the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have
brought a new development in state secrets law: an increasing number of
242private suits in which the state secrets privilege is raised. Reynolds clear-
234 See id at 87.
235 See generally El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535 (E.D. Va. 2006); Terkel v. AT&T Corp.,
441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
236 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
23Jd.
238 See Brief for United States at 27-28, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F. 3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007) (No.
06-17137) 2007 WL 2051826.
239 See generally Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 97, for an analysis of appeals generated by litigation
management issues.
240 See generally Goodwin, supra note I (examining government-imposed secrecy with respect to doc-
uments filed in federal court).
241 See generally Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d I (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983); id.
242 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2010).
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ly says that the privilege "belongs to the government and must be asserted
by it." 243 This means that in order for the privilege to arise in private litiga-
tion, typically the government as intervenor raises it in order to terminate
244the litigation, but in at least one case discussed below it was a private par-
ty who raised the issue on its own.245
In some state secrets cases, the government acts as an intervenor.
Hepting v. AT&T and Terkel v. AT&T, which challenged the Bush admin-
istration's warrantless wiretapping programs, initially took the form of suits
by private parties or class plaintiffs against telecommunications carriers
who allegedly assisted the government in carrying out wiretapping or rec-
246
ords-gathering. In both cases, however, the United States intervened and
241
asserted the state secrets privilege2. One of the clearest articulations of the
government's reason for doing so can be found in the transcript of the
248
Hepting motion hearing. It was incumbent on the attorney for the United
States to explain why the suit could not proceed; it was not because the
government stood to lose anything tangible by the discovery requests of the
plaintiffs, but because any admission or denial by defendant AT&T might
confer an advantage on terrorists seeking to utilize the communications
networks owned by plaintiffs. 24 9 To understand the government's action
here, the nature of an intervenor in a legal proceeding must be addressed:
how does one gain access to an ongoing case and potentially affect the out-
come?
"Intervenor" status is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which stipulates the conditions for intervention both as of right
and permissive.250 The reason for regulating the entrance of intervenors in-
to a lawsuit - the reason there is a standard that must be met to intervene -
is to preserve the stake of the parties in the suit. F.R.C.P. 24(a) limits the
243 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7 (1953).
244 Id. at 7-8.
245 Jd.
246 See generally Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Terkel v. AT&T
Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006).
247 Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 979; Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 901.
248 See generally Transcript of Proceedings, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (No. 06-cv-00672).
24 Id. at 7-9.
250 FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
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right to intervene by allowing intervention as of right only when "the dispo-
sition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [an appli-
cant's] ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties."2 5 1 Similarly, F.R.C.P. 24 (b) limits
permissive intervention by requiring the court to consider "whether the in-
tervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties."252 Thus, courts view a movant who wants to intervene
in an ongoing action with at least some suspicion. Of course, the question
in state secrets cases is not whether the federal government should be per-
mitted to intervene in a matter involving national security, but rather what is
the scope and nature of that intervention, and how does it complicate the lit-
igation and affect the rights of the original parties? Given that the govern-
ment in state secrets cases typically seeks dismissal or summary judgment,
253the effect on the original parties could not be more extreme2. In at least
one case, the government raised an issue that would have been more appro-
priate for the defense to raise: that the case should be dismissed because the
state secrets privilege would prevent the private defendant (e.g., AT&T)
254from presenting an adequate defense2. This solicitude is unusual; the gov-
ernment's interest, presumably, is to keep certain information from entering
255the public domain via the discovery process2. Whether the defendant can
256
effectively assert a defense is a separate question2. Information control
could be accomplished even if the defendant lost the suit.257 Dismissal on
the pleadings is less risky in terms of information leaks than a suit that con-
tinues through discovery, but focusing on the defendant's strategic posture
obfuscates the government's true concern. This is yet another procedural
irregularity arising when the state secrets privilege is applied to private liti-
gation. Of course, not all the wiretapping suits post-2005 were private.258
ACLU v. NSA was a suit brought directly against the government, so the
259question of intervention did not arise in that case.
In Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies, the United States intervened in
251 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (emphasis added).
252 FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).
253 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
254 See Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
255 Jd.
256 d
257 Jd.
258 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'I Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
259 See generally id.
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what had originally been a patent infringement/trade secret dispute between
260
two private entities2. Crater sued Lucent over an alleged patent infringe-
ment involving an underwater connecting device (a "coupler") for fiber op-
tics.261 The government intervened to prevent discovery related to the cou-
pler, alleging that national security would be at risk if any information
262
about the device were disclosed. Potentially, this intervention would de-
prive Plaintiff Crater Corp. of its right of action, and predictably, Defendant
Lucent tried to extricate itself from the suit by characterizing the main issue
in the case as a dispute between Crater and the government that should be
263settled in the Court of Claims. A fight over disclosure ensued in the trial
264
court2. The government claimed it could not provide any of the 26,000
documents implicated by Crater's discovery request, but the trial judge ex-
amined those documents in camera and ordered the government to release
some of them.265 The government refused to do so, and submitted instead,
at a show cause hearing, a classified declaration explaining its need for se-
266
crecy. The trial court changed its position at that point and dismissed the
267
complaint. Crater disputed the secrecy of the documents, citing deposi-
tion testimony in which Lucent employees actually denied that the coupling
268device was, in fact, a classified government secret2. In the end, the Feder-
al Circuit remanded for a more precise determination of the issues in-
volved.269 "[W]e do not believe," the court stated, "the record in the case . .
. is sufficiently developed to enable a determination as to the effect of the
government's assertion of the privilege on those claims." 2 70 This ruling did
not resolve the dispute, but served simply to clarify the issues on the re-
mand.
The dissenting judge agreed that further proceedings were needed, but
took issue with the assertion of the state secrets privilege, noting that the
appeals court had seen "only one of the 26,000 documents, which con-
tain[ed] . .. only the general statement that (unidentified) documents were
reviewed (by somebody unnamed) and claim[ed] the state secrets privilege
211 Crater Corp. v. Lucent Tech., Inc, 423 F.3d 1260, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
261 Jd at 1262.
262 Jd. at 1263.
S d. at 1263-64.
264 d
1 d. at 1264-65.
266 Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1265.
267 d
268 Jd. at 1269.
269 d
o d. at 1268.
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without limitation"71 In the dissent's view, this did not constitute suffi-
cient particularity for an assertion of the privilege, and such a broad asser-
tion, if accepted, would create "obstacles . . . that may be insurmountable"
for the plaintiffs on remand.2 2
The Crater case illustrates several troubling aspects of the current state
secrets privilege as applied to private litigation. First, it shows that inter-
vention by the government can easily bring an end to an ongoing dispute, as
discovery can be completely blocked by the government intervenor.273 Se-
cond, the government can effectively resist discovery rulings by a trial
judge who has reviewed allegedly secret materials. 4  Thus, an in camera
review is a crucial safeguard in state secrets cases, for it allows an inde-
pendent judicial determination of secrecy apart from what the executive
claims.275 However, the court's ability to inspect documents and order that
they be provided to opposing counsel must be clear and undisputed. Final-
ly, the particularity requirement in the executive's review of purportedly se-
cret information must be enforced, or private litigants risk losing the ability
to litigate their claims as soon as the government simply asserts that secret
documents are involved.276 Here, Crater claimed to know that many of the
documents had already been made public,277 and yet the executive branch
successfully asserted that the documents were secret, apparently without
fully examining them.278 Although the court in Crater did order a clarifica-
tion of the issues before allowing the state secrets privilege to shut the case
down,2 9 it did not go far enough in ordering the government to make a par-
ticularized showing. The risk of injustice is clear, and it presents itself in
other private litigation as well.
E. State Secrets Within the Secret Presidency
The significance of the state secrets privilege has also changed along
Id. at 1270 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
m Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1269 (Newman, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273 See id
274 See id
275 See id at 1264-65.
276 See id at 1265 (stating that the privilege is not to be lightly invoked).
277 Id. at 1267.
278 Compare Crater Corp., 432 F.3d at 1264-65, with Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1270 (Newman, J., dis-
senting).
279 Crater Corp., 423 F.3d at 1262 (stating that the case was remanded for reconsideration at the trial
court level).
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with institutional developments in presidential power.280 The state secrets
doctrine is but one weapon in an arsenal of techniques that began to take
shape in the post-Watergate period, and the development of which was ac-
celerated by the Bush administration. 281 The state secrets privilege in isola-
tion is very different from the privilege as part of institutionalized secrecy.
When the state secrets privilege is seen alongside expanded executive privi-
lege, greater surveillance powers, increased classification authority, and the
ability to search, seize, and detain pursuant to terror investigation, it be-
comes far more threatening. The state secrets privilege can be used after
the fact to cover up executive overreaching and, in anticipation of its use,
the executive can confidently keep its activities secret and engage in con-
duct that would bring criticism if the public learned about it. The flurry of
state secrets-related litigation following 9/11 is a testament to the Bush ad-
ministration's vigorous use of the privilege, and in fact many of the cases
cited in this Part arose in that period.
Aggressive use of the privilege can be a double-edged sword, however,
and may produce unintended effects. While the state secrets privilege has
been invoked successfully many times since 9/11, it is also true that federal
courts have generated more case law on the issue since then. Sometimes
that case law has gone against the government (at least pending appeal, as
282in Hepting), but regardless of the outcome of each individual case, it is
undeniable that there are new issues, new questions, and new approaches to
managing discovery disputes arising from courts around the country at both
the trial and appellate levels. It is far from settled law.
Fifty years ago, the Reynolds court could not have foreseen the current
controversy over anti-terror programs (their necessity and the threats such
programs pose to civil liberties). Today, those very programs form the sub-
ject matter of many state secrets cases. It is clear that the doctrine has be-
come unwieldy, and that the broad, unfettered protective rule that has gov-
erned these cases for over fifty years is inadequate to balance the
compelling claims of national security on the one hand and government ac-
countability for civil liberties violations (and other violations of law) on the
other.
The state secrets doctrine is ripe for judicial rethinking. Reynolds has
created numerous problems, and the Supreme Court would do well to over-
2 See ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW, 84-93
(2007).
281 Id at 42.
282 Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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rule the decision. At the very least, the decision could be narrowed and ap-
plied in more flexible ways, emphasizing certain parts of the holding. For
example, the increased use of in camera inspection noted above is dis-
cussed by the Reynolds court (albeit in contradictory wayS);283 more exten-
sive use of that process would counteract overuse of the privilege because
judges would review the purportedly secret material. Similarly, by focusing
on the declaration that "judicial control over evidence in a case cannot be
abandoned to the caprice of executive officers,"284 federal courts could em-
phasize accountability rather than secrecy. Even if state secrets cases are
unique and best treated on a case-by-case basis, there is still room for fash-
ioning a larger role for the courts. Paramount in that role must be the
courts' ability to secure compliance with discovery orders and to compel in
camera submissions when such submissions are necessary to do justice.
Self-serving declarations of why secrecy protection is appropriate are no
substitute for reviewing actual documentary evidence alleged to contain
state secrets. We must believe that the role of courts in protecting individu-
als against government abuse is just as important as the role of the execu-
tive in safeguarding national security.
F. Mosaics and State Secrets: A Brief History
Although mosaics have already been mentioned in this section, a brief
review of their history in state secrets litigation is in order. The 1979 case
of Halkin v. Helms saw the first use of the mosaic theory in the state secrets
context.285 Halkin involved warrantless surveillance of the communications
286
of antiwar activists during the Vietnam War. In discovery, the plaintiffs
sought to know "whether international communications of the plaintiffs
have been acquired by the NSA and disseminated to other federal agen-
cies."28 Here, the information sought by the plaintiffs was not substantive.
This discovery request did not concern the content of intercepted communi-
cations. Nor did it involve what is called "sources and methods" of intelli-
gence gathering. Rather, the discovery question at issue had to do with the
288
path of information from one federal agency to others2. It is difficult to
283 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1953).
284d.
285 Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
286 Jd at 3.
287 d
288 d
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see how the simple confirmation or denial that information had been ob-
tained and/or shared would endanger national security. To put this problem
slightly differently, the government needed to articulate a nexus between
the contested discovery request and its ability to safeguard national security
in a case where that nexus would be far from obvious to the observer.28 9
When that nexus was described by the government and accepted by the
court, the D.C. Circuit articulated it as follows, in what would become the
foundational use of the mosaic theory in state secrets cases:
It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign intelligence
gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the construction of
a
mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair. Thousands of
bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be analyzed and fitted
into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole must operate.290
Thus, "[t]housands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous infor-
mation" could now be shielded from disclosure on the grounds that they
might help to construct a mosaic of intelligence operations at some later
point.291 As such, the state secrets privilege could be used to protect "in-
nocuous" information that had no national security implications on its face.
Moreover, the application of the mosaic concept here would require future
plaintiffs to "prove a negative" once the government asserted state secrets
292privilege in mosaic form - which the government had every reason to do,
of course, given the all but boundless new parameters of the doctrine. In
the face of a mosaic claim, plaintiffs would be required to demonstrate that
the information at issue could never form even a small part of any narrative
293
related to national security. Of course, it is impossible to show that any
particular piece of information could not be utilized to construct a mosaic
with larger implications. In state secrets cases, then, to state the mosaic
theory is to raise an insurmountable obstacle to proceeding with discovery.
The mosaic theory was applied once again in the case of Kasza v.
Browner,294 a suit arising out of injuries suffered by workers at the infa-
mous "Area 51" site near Groom Lake in Nevada. Workers at the site had
289 d. at 8.
290 d
291 Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d at 8.
292 Jd at 9 (stating that courts are to give government agency's claim's of privilege the "utmost defer-
ence").
293 d. at 8-9.
294 Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 1998).
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developed a skin disease and sought, among other things, information re-
garding the chemicals to which they had been exposed so that they could
treat their illness properly. 295  These requests were denied, and counsel for
the plaintiffs was subjected to searches and threats. A protective cloak of
secrecy was thrown around the facility, its operations and every piece of in-
formation associated with it, including the facility's name. The court as-
sisted in this coverture by invoking the mosaic theory:
Protection through classification is required if the combination of unclas-
sified items of information provides an added factor that warrants protec-
tion of the information taken as a whole. This theory of classification is
commonly known as the mosaic or compilation theory. The mosaic theory
of classification applies to some of the information associated with the op-
erating location near Groom Lake. Although the operating location near
Groom Lake has no official name, it is sometimes referred to by the name
or names of programs that have been conducted there. The names of some
programs are classified; all program names are classified when they are as-
sociated with the specific location or with other classified programs. Con-
sequently, the release of any such names would disclose classified infor-
-296
mation .
The Kasza opinion treats classification and state secrets as coextensive,
eliminating the possibility that classified information could eventually be-
291
come public knowledge2. It is striking that a place like "Area 51," well-
298 299known in the popular press and the subject of television shows, would
require such a degree of secrecy that even its name could not be con-
firmed.300
295 Id. at 1162.
2 96 
Id. at 1181-82.
297 Id. at 1170.
298 See, e.g., Area 51 News Articles, Dreamland Resort,
http://www.dreamlandresort.com/area5 /news articles.html (last modified Oct. 16, 2012).
299 See, e.g., National Geographic Search, National Geographic,
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/search/?search-area+51 (last visited Nov. 9, 2012).
300 Kasza, 325 F. 3d at 1281-82 (Wood, J., concurring) ("After oral argument in the successive appeal,
I initially indicated my approval of the draft submitted by Judge Rymer. However, while the case was
still pending, I viewed a History Channel documentary entitled 'Area 51: Beyond Top Secret.' I have
sent the other panel members copies of this documentary. Ordinarily I would not consider something
that appeared on the television and was not a part of the record. I recognize that the information con-
tained in the video has not been confirmed or denied by the government, and this concurrence is not in-
tended to vouch one way or the other as to its truth. I do, however, believe this documentary is pertinent.
In the documentary, counsel for plaintiffs, Professor Jonathan Turley of George Washington University,
makes the point that all he wanted for his clients in these cases was to gain knowledge that would aid in
their treatment, and not a big money judgment against the government. I write separately to urge the
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After 9/11, the mosaic theory was offered with vigor in state secrets cas-
es. 30 1 Whistleblower Sibel Edmonds, an FBI translator, was fired after
complaining about malfeasance in her office, where translation of important
terrorism-related documents took place.302 Following her termination, she
sued twice: once to contest her discharge303 and once to compel production
of certain documents related to her situation.304  The government claimed
305the state secrets privilege in both cases0. In the FOJA case, the trial judge
dismissed the suit based on the state secrets privilege and cited the mosaic
theory to bar disclosure of a wide range of facts, including some facts that
were under the control of the plaintiff herself.306 In the termination suit, the
trial judge opined that since the threat of global terrorism would not abate
anytime soon, the rationale for barring plaintiffs suit from proceeding
would be longstanding.30' Accordingly, she should not expect the courts to
examine evidence related to the "war on terror," in this or any other pro-
ceeding, for the foreseeable future.30 s
In Doe v. Gonzales,309 the plaintiffs challenged the use of National Secu-
rity Letters ("NSLs") to obtain library records under the PATRIOT Act.
This challenge was based on the First Amendment's free speech clause;3lo
the suit alleged that the prohibition on disclosure of NSLs was a content-
based speech restriction and was therefore invalid. " In response to plain-
tiff's First Amendment challenge, the government's assertion of a compel-
ling interest was based on national security concerns, and it implicated the
mosaic theory by virtue of the attenuated and speculative national security
312harms that might result from disclosure of the existence of specific NSLs.
The court disagreed:
government, now that these cases are concluded, to strongly consider releasing any information possible
which might aid plaintiffs. That is unless, of course, there is no information which might help them, or if
the disclosure of any helpful information that may exist would still risk significant harm to national se-
curity under the mosaic theory.").
301 David Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115
YALE L. J. 628 (2005).
302 Edmonds v. U.S., 436 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2006).
303 Id. at 28-38.
304 Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 405 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2005).
305 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 68.
306 Edmonds, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33.
307 Edmonds, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 82.
308 Id. at 82 n. 7.
309 Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005).
310 Id. at 69.
3 1 1 Id. at 73-74.
312 Id. at 75-76.
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Thus, it does not appear that this "mosaic" argument has been used in
this type of context. However, even if it were appropriate, the defendants'
conclusory statements that the mosaic argument is applicable here, absent
supporting facts, would not suffice to support a judicial finding to that ef-
fect. The court asked the defendants' counsel at oral argument if he could
confirm there was a "mosaic" in this case: were there other bits of infor-
mation which, when coupled with Doe's identity, would hinder this investi-
313
gation. Counsel did not do so.
By finding that the "compelling interest" in protecting national security
asserted by the government as justification for its content-based speech re-
striction was insufficient, the district court rejected the mosaic theory in this
initial trial court ruling.314
The litigation did not end there, however. The Reauthorization Act
changed some of the requirements for NSLs, " and the case was remanded,
going through several more rounds as the governing statutory law
316
changed. In the end, however, the Doe case stands as an example of a
court probing beyond the mere assertion of the mosaic theory and requiring
the government to explain what would comprise the mosaic by fleshing out
its frame. To be sure, the First Amendment claim provided a unique doctri-
nal "hook" on which to hang this ruling limiting executive secrecy, but the
court was willing to use it.
To some extent, what is at work in the state secrets-related use of the
mosaic theory is simply an opportunistic move by the executive to increase
power. If a legal doctrine has been offered in the past and accepted whole-
sale by the courts, why not take advantage of it? As has been pointed out
elsewhere,3 ' there is no downside to asserting the state secrets privilege
generally and the mosaic theory in particular. There have been dissenting
voices along the way (Judge Bazelon in Halkin, for example),3  but too of-
313 Id at 78.
314 Id
315 USA Patriot Improvement & Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 115- 119, 120
Star. 211 (2005).
316 See Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 885 (2d Cir. 2008).
317 See William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCL Q.
85, 111 (2005)
318 See Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J., commenting).
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ten the majority of the appellate panel defers to the government's mosaic-
based secrecy claim.
Another protracted legal dispute arose out of the practice of "extraordi-
nary rendition." 320 In addition to the Arar and El-Masri cases discussed
above, there was an attempt to sue the Jeppesen company as a private de-
fendant.32 ' Jeppesen, a subsidiary of Boeing, was under contract with the
CIA to provide flight planning and logistical support for rendition flights,
and several rendition victims filed suit against Jeppesen.322  The United
States intervened in the suit and then attempted to shut it down, arguing that
the very subject matter of the case - the rendition program, whose existence
they would neither admit or deny - was a state secret and that therefore the
323case must be found barred by Totten or dismissed at the outset. Though
the district court initially agreed,324 a panel of the Ninth Circuit did not.325
The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc, and this time they
326found in favor of the government intervenor and Jeppesen3. It must be
pointed out that this was not a formal invocation of mosaic, but the gov-
ernment's legal position was certainly inspired by the doctrine. The court
considered the following information to require protection from disclosure:
Information that would tend to confirm or deny whether Jeppesen or any
other private entity assisted the CIA with clandestine intelligence activities;
information about whether any foreign government cooperated with the
CIA in clandestine intelligence activities; information about the scope or
operation of the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program; any oth-
er information concerning CIA clandestine intelligence operations that
would tend to reveal intelligence activities, sources, or methods.32
And once again, the court here faced the problem of disentangling non-
319 Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 97, at 86.
320 See generally Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
321 Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530
(E.D. Va. 2006); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
322 Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
3 23 Id. at 1132-33.
324 Id. at 1128.
325 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 993 (9th Cir. 2009).
3 26 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).
327 Id. at 1086.
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privileged evidence from privileged items. Implicitly, then, this is a mo-
saic-type case, even if the government does not designate it as such. The
aim is to prevent potential terrorists from assembling information about
rendition into a mosaic that could facilitate future terror attacks.329
Though the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc ruled to dismiss the suit330
(thus overturning the panel decision), their analysis was complex. First, the
court held the Totten bar did not definitively apply to suits where, as here,
the plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the government and it was
not clear that the "very subject matter of the case was a state secret."33'
Thus, the case would have to be decided under the Reynolds framework.
Equally interesting, the court found that, as of 2010, the extraordinary ren-
332dition program was not a state secret. Nonetheless, there was no way, the
court felt, to proceed to discovery without implicating state secrets.
In an impassioned dissent, several judges said, among other things, that
dismissing the case at the pre-discovery stage sent the "wrong message" to
the district court.334 The lower court should be required and expected to
engage in evidentiary review even though the case involved state secrets.
The dissent also appended to the opinion a long chart listing the public
source documents and what factual propositions they established3. Re-
viewing the chart, one can see that all of the referenced documents are pub-
licly available.
At times, judicial impatience with overbroad assertions of state secrets
shows through. Federal judge Royce Lamberth presided over a decade-long
suit by a DEA employee alleging that the CIA had illegally wiretapped his
338 339
residence. Initially dismissed on state secrets grounds, the case was
reinstated when the court learned that the government lied, falsely asserting
that a certain CIA employee was a covert operative when in fact it knew
328 Jd at 1082.
329 Jd at 1073.
330 Jd at 1093.
331 Jd at 1084 (finding that the court did not need to conclusively resolve those issues because state
secrets compelled dismissal in any event).
332 Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1090.
333 d at 1088-89.
334 d at 1095 (Hawkins, J., Schroeder, J., Canby, J., Thomas, J., and Paez, J., dissenting).
335 d.
3 36 Jd at 1102-31.
337 d.
338 Horn v. Huddle, 636 F. Supp. 2d 10, 13 (D.D.C. 2009).
339 d.
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that he was not.340 "The deference generally granted the executive branch
in matters of classification and national security must yield," Lamberth
wrote, "when the Executive attempts to exert control over the court-
room." 341 Lamberth also sought sanctions against the officials who had
342
made the false statements3. When the case resumed, the government con-
tinued to assert the state secrets privilege to cover a wide range of infor-
343
mation. Among other things, government lawyers argued that a govern-
ment-issue coffee table, allegedly containing a listening device, was a state
344
secret. Judge Lamberth noted that this equipment could hardly be con-
sidered a state secret since a similar table stood on display at the Spy Muse-
um in Washington, D.C.345
Horn v. Huddle did not involve a direct application of the mosaic theory.
Two points are notable here, though. First, this case offered an opportunity
to see how the privilege could be asserted to cover information whose dis-
346closure could not realistically threaten harm to the United States3. As in
Jeppesen347 and Al-Haramain,348 there were already alternative public
sources of the same information.349 In addition, though the mosaic theory
was not explicit here, Horn shows how the mosaic concept loses explanato-
ry force when relevant information is already in the public domain. The
goal of state secrets protection and the goal of the government when ad-
vancing the mosaic theory in state secrets cases are similar: to keep some-
one - presumably, enemies of the United States - from using certain infor-
mation to effect harm. Thus, the mosaic concept in its restrictive form is
parasitic on the state secrets privilege. Its force and continued relevance are
derived from the larger concept of state secrets protection.
III. THE MOSAIC THEORY IN POST-9/11 HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
As part of its "war on terror," the Bush administration sought to detain
individuals for an indefinite period of time when those individuals were
340 Id at 15.
341 Horn v. Huddle, 647 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65-66 (D.D.C. 2009).
342 Horn, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 20.
343 Id at 16.
344 Id at 17 n. 9.
345 The case was subsequently settled and the opinions vacated by 699 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C. 2010).
346 Horn, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
347 Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
348 Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007).
349 See, e.g., Horn, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 17 n. 9.
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suspected of connections to terrorist groups."' Often these detainees were
not charged with any crime, but were simply detained and, in most cases,
interrogated.35' In addition, the administration wanted to keep the detainees
out of the federal courts. A struggle ensued between the administration and
the Supreme Court over the extent to which these two objectives - indefi-
nite detention and no access to the courts - could be pursued.352 Between
2004 and 2008, the Court handed down four important decisions involving
detainees' rights: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Rasul v. Bush, Hamdan v.
355 356Rumsfeld and Bounediene v. Bush. Hamdi concerned the ability of the
executive to detain U.S. citizens in the course of the war on terror.35  The
Court acknowledged that the executive could, in fact, detain "enemy com-
batants" under the authority of the Authorization for Use of Military Force
("AUMF") for the duration of the conflict, but insisted that certain proce-
dural safeguards had to be provided to those detainees, including a hearing
to determine whether they were properly classified as enemy combatants.
In Rasul, the Court ruled that detainees at Guantanamo fell under the feder-
360
al habeas statute. In the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court
ruled that the military commissions being used to try some of the detainees
were unlawful, as they violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice361 and
362the international law standards of legal process codified therein. Finally,
in Boumediene v. Bush, the Court ruled in 2008 that detainees at the Guan-
tanamo detention facility had the right to petition for habeas corpus in fed-
363
eral court. Since Congress had not suspended the writ in accordance with
364Article One of the Constitution, habeas corpus was available to challenge
365detention.
3 50 See Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. L. REV. 335, 352 (2005).
351 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004).
352 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
353 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
354 Rasul, 542 U.S. 466.
355 Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
356 Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723.
357 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (2004).
358 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); id. at 517.
359 Id. at 532-33.
360 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466-67.
361 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 624-25.
362 Jd.
363 Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 723-24.
364 Jd.
365 Jd.
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Baher Azmy has shown that the Boumediene decision generated a "new
common law of habeas."366 Once the Supreme Court found in Boumediene
that Guantanamo detainees were entitled to petition for habeas corpus, the
number of those petitions lodged with the federal courts multiplied, and the
courts needed to develop procedural and substantive decisional rules they
could apply consistently as litigants presented habeas petitions for re-
view.367 There was a certain amount of novelty here. Federal courts review
368
many habeas petitions each year, of course, but there are obvious differ-
ences, as Azmy notes, between petitioners making collateral challenges to
criminal convictions on the one hand, and suspected terrorists detained
without charges and seeking release from executive detention on the oth-
er.369 The most salient procedural difference is the type of determination
being challenged. In criminal cases, a habeas petitioner typically has been
convicted and has exhausted available appeals.3'0 The habeas petition is a
collateral challenge to the fact of confinement but it often (though not al-
ways) involves a claim of rights violation in the context of the criminal tri-
al. 31 Post-9/1 1 executive detainees, by contrast, challenge their classifica-
tion as enemy combatants.3 2 When the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi that
the executive branch could detain enemy combatants as part of the war on
terror, the Court also required that anyone detained as an "enemy combat-
ant" be provided with a hearing before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal
("CSRT"). The CSRT hearing would produce a determination that each
detainee had been properly classified as an enemy combatant.374
Both before and after the Boumediene decision, the federal courts heard
366 See Robert M. Pallitto, The Legacy of the Magna Carta in Recent Detainees' Rights Decisions, 43
POL. SCL & POL. 483, 483-86 (2010).
367 See Azmy, supra note 35, at 448-50.
368 Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Op-Ed., Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/04/17/opinion/ 7hoffmann.html.
369 Azmy, supra note 35, at 514.
370 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) ("This
Court has long held that a state prisoner's federal habeas petition should be dismissed if the prisoner has
not exhausted available state remedies as to any of his federal claims.").
371 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510-11 (1982) (considering
petitioner's allegations that he had been denied the right to a fair trial on four grounds).
372 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004); cf § 2241(e), recognizedas unconstitu-
tional by Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2009).
373 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
3 74 See id at 533-34.
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detainee petitions alleging unlawful confinement. Once again, the gov-
ernment asserted the mosaic theory as a means to defeat those petitions.3 6
Here, the mosaic was offered by the government in an expansive sense: they
sought to construct (or at least begin to construct in broad outline) a mosaic
of interrelated facts that showed the necessity of continuing to detain a giv-
en individual. In other words, the government invited the court to view
the mosaic it had constructed so that the court would see why detention was
necessary and release dangerous. Courts reviewing habeas petitions, how-
ever, have not always accepted the expansive conception of the mosaic the-
ory the government offers.
The case of Ali Ahmed v. Obama3 9 is one instance where this judicial re-
luctance can be seen, at least at the trial level. Ali Ahmed's habeas petition
was adjudicated in 2009, post-Boumediene.380 The district judge undertook
a searching review of the evidence and ultimately ruled in favor of the ha-
beas petitioner, granting his petition.3s The judge also discussed the mosa-
ic theory at some length, suggesting in the process some limits to applica-
tion of that theory in habeas cases. The government had sought to construct
a mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would justify the petitioner's con-
tinued detention. The government presented a collection of bits of evidence
that did not prove unlawful activity standing alone, but could allegedly be
imbricated in a mosaic that could depict enemy combatant activity. It is
important to keep in mind that the standard of proof in the detention cases is
a preponderance of the evidence rather than reasonable doubt.38 2 Nonethe-
less, the judge did not find the government's case sufficient to carry even
that burden. Invoking mosaic imagery, the court said,
Even using the Government's theoretical model of a mosaic, it must be
acknowledged that the mosaic theory is only as persuasive as the tiles
which compose it and the glue which binds them together -just as a brick
wall is only as strong as the individual bricks which support it and the ce-
ment that keeps the bricks in place. Therefore, if the individual pieces of a
375 Compare Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566-67 (2006), with Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 2-4 (D.D.C. 2009).
376 See, e.g., Mohammed, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 7-8.
377 See, e.g., id at 7.
378 See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. 2009).
379 Id.; see also Azmy, supra note 35, at 523.
3 80 Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
381 Id at 52.
382 See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280(GK), 2009 WL 2584685, at *1, *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 21,
2009), rev'd, 613 F.3d. 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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mosaic are inherently flawed or do not fit together, then the mosaic will
split apart, just as the brick wall will collapse.
Two of the most significant pieces of evidence offered alleged that Ali
384Ahmed received military training at a training camp in Afghanistan, and
the fact that he had adopted a kunya, or special name. It was alleged that
terrorists often take on kunyas (in order to escape detection), but non-
terrorists adopt them as well.38  Also, there was evidence that petitioner
stayed in a guesthouse in Faisalabad, which had been used at times by Al
386Qaeda members. The opinion contains numerous redactions, which make
it difficult for the reader to get a clear sense of the presentation, but what
does come across clearly is the highly inferential nature of the evidence
against the detainee. In order to conclude that there was sufficient evi-
dence to justify continued detention (that is, a preponderance tending to
show that Ali Ahmed supported or took part in hostilities against the United
States or its partners), the court would have to indulge a number of infer-
ences from the established facts, such as there were. Petitioner had alleged-
ly taken a kunya and stayed in a guesthouse in Afghanistan where Al Qaeda
members had also stayed; taken together, the government claimed these
facts should be used to infer that petitioner was an enemy combatant.3 88
The judge was unwilling to make these inferences.
Given the nature of the proceedings by which detainees were classified
as enemy combatants in the first place,390 it would be warranted to conclude
that the mosaic theory is particularly inapt when applied to justify continued
detention. The hearing process was so disadvantageous to detainees and so
heavily weighted to favor the government that the mosaic-type evidence
presentations made by the government at the habeas stage simply com-
pounded the already-significant injustice of the initial classificatory process.
The post-Boumediene habeas proceedings involved petitioners who had
been classified following hearings before a Combatant Status Review Tri-
bunal ("CSRT").39 1 Information obtained from the Department of Defense
383 Id at *5.
3 84 Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 59, 63.
385 Id at 63; see also Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (explaining tradi-
tional use of kunyas and alleged terrorist use to evade detection).
386 Id
387 See generally id.
388 Id at 59.
389 Id. at 66.
3 90 See Ahmed, 613 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
391 MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS, 2 (2006), available at
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through the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") requests and in the
course of habeas proceedings depicts a hearing process that falls far short of
fundamental procedural fairness.392 In a report entitled No-Hearing Hear-
ings, Mark and Joshua Denbeaux present statistics on 558 CSRT hear-
ings. 9  Among many striking statistics, the authors report that in 96% of
the cases for which information was available, "[t]he Government did not
produce any witnesses in any hearing and did not present any documentary
evidence to the detainee prior to the hearing." 394 Moreover, all defense re-
quests to call witnesses from outside Guantanamo were denied,95 and 74%
of defense requests to call witnesses who were inside Guantanamo were al-
396
so denied. Although a personal representative (instead of a lawyer) was
assigned to each detainee at the hearing, those individuals frequently failed
to participate, and sometimes advocated for the government. Thus, the
subsequent habeas hearings entailed review of a record that was developed
in conditions most unfavorable to the detainee. One might suspect that the
procedural unfairness of the CSRT hearing would make the habeas pro-
ceeding easier to win, in the sense that the process violations could be
shown to amount to detention in violation of the law. This has not been the
case, however. Instead, government attorneys have tried to bootstrap the
CSRT findings onto a defense of the detention at the habeas stage by using
the mosaic theory.
Despite the difficulties facing the detainee at a CSRT hearing, three of
the cases Denbeaux and Denbeaux surveyed did, in fact, result in a finding
that the detainee was not, or was no longer, an enemy combatant.398 Thus,
three detainees were able to overcome the difficult procedural obstacles and
establish that their detention was improper, even by the government's own
standard.39 However, two of the three victorious individuals were re-
examined at a second CSRT and found to be enemy combatants. 400 The
third victorious individual actually won a second hearing as well, at which
point he was ordered adjudicated a third time.401 The third time, he lost,
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/final nohearing hearings report.pdf.
392 See generally id.
393 d.
394 Id. at 2.
3 95 Id. at 2-3.
396 Id. at 3.
397 DENBEAUX, supra note 391, at 3.
398 Jd.
399 d.
400 Jd.
401 Jd.
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and was declared an enemy combatant.402
Baher Azmy underscores the importance of the habeas remedy for de-
tainees who have been classified as enemy combatants:
Although the Government has often asserted that its enemy-combatant designa-
tions, even ones made for persons apprehended thousands of miles from any
battlefield, are consistent with the laws of war and the Court's decision in
Hamdi, it has not yet been meaningfully held to account for its numerous de-
partures from the elementary limitations imposed by the laws of war on its au-
thority to detain.
In view of this executive branch activity, properly conducted habeas pro-
ceedings "might meaningfully constrict the Executive's expansive claims of
detention authority."4 04 Thus, there would seem to be a need for flexible
applications of habeas rules and the development of standards infused with
some skepticism for reviewing the government's justifications for deten-
tion. The court's rejection - on the theory's own terms - of the mosaic the-
ory in Ali Ahmed is an example of such skepticism.40 5
The district judge in Al-Adahi v. Obama406 also considered and rejected
the mosaic theory.40 There, the government did not offer the theory explic-
itly, but rather referred to it as a way of understanding the case. 40The
judge conceded that mosaic analysis is a "common and well-established
mode of analysis in the intelligence community."409 Considering it in a ha-
beas proceeding, though, she had this to say:
Nonetheless, at this point in this long, drawn-out litigation the Court's
obligation is to make findings of fact and conclusions of law which satisfy
appropriate and relevant legal standards as to whether the Government has
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the Petitioner is justifiably
detained. The kind and amount of evidence which satisfies the intelligence
community in reaching final conclusions about the value of information it
obtains may be very different from, and certainly cannot determine, this
402 d
403 Azmy, supra note 35, at 499.
404 d
405 Jd. at 523.
406 Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280(GK), 2009 WL 2584685 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009), rev'd, 613 F.3d.
1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
407 Jd at *16.
408 d at *5.
409 d
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Court's ruling.40
As in Ali Ahmed, the district judge in Al-Adahi declined to link the
speculative and highly inferential components of the government's case in a
mosaic greater than the sum of its parts.41' One reason she did not want to
do this - and ruled for the petitioner instead - had to do with the nature of
the evidence itself.412 The admissibility of evidentiary material was
hotly contested for a host of different reasons ranging from the fact that it con-
tains second-level hearsay to allegations that it was obtained by torture to the
fact that no statement purports to be a verbatim account of what was said.4 1
However, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court's granting of the
habeas petition in Al-Adahi.414 Reviewing the decision, which was made
under a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, the D.C. Circuit rejected
the lower court's reading of the evidence, 415 essentially re-assembling the
government's mosaic in place of the court's reading of the evidence. "Hav-
ing tossed aside the government's evidence," the D.C. Circuit said, "one
piece at a time, the court came to the manifestly incorrect - indeed star-
tling - conclusion that 'there is no reliable evidence in the record that Peti-
tioner was a member of al-Qaida and/or the Taliban."' 416 Here, the review-
ing court took issue with the interpretation of the facts in the proceeding
below, reversing the district court because its evaluation of the facts was
"manifestly incorrect."417 In one sense, this unusually non-deferential ap-
proach to appellate review can be explained by the developing nature of this
body of law; i.e., "war on terror" detainee habeas proceedings. Boumediene
was decided by the Supreme Court in 2008418 and the Al-Adahi habeas peti-
tion was adjudicated in 2009.4'9 The D.C. Circuit ruled on the Al-Adahi ap-
peal in 2010, such that all of these events took place within a two-year span
410 d
411 Jd at *16.
412 Al-Adahi, 2009 WL 2584685 at *4.
413 d
414 Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F. 3d. 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
415 Jd. at 1104.
416 Jd. at 1106 .
417 Jd.
418 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
419 Al-Adahi, 2009 WL 2584685.
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of time.4 20
However, the appellate ruling in this case indicates something else,
as well. While the Al-Adahi court was surprisingly non-deferential to the
trial court, its opinion evinces a striking deference to executive power. The
court privileged the executive's institutional judgment over the normal
standard of review for trial-level fact questions. 4 21 Further, the appellate
422
ruling embarks on a discourse about statistical probabilities4. Of course,
the importance of properly calculating statistical probabilities looms large
in a case governed by a preponderance standard - a standard that turns on
likelihoods rather than near-certainties.42 In essence, the appellate panel
chose to accept the government's "composite" view of the evidence over
the lower court's validity judgments about each piece. This was a sort of
"mosaic theory writ large," in the sense that it was not only about what the
evidence in this case meant, but also about the proper way to review evi-
424dence in general4. Associated events raise probabilities, the court seemed
to say: if X and Y are common characteristics of terrorists, then a suspect
who exemplifies both X and Y is more likely to be terrorist than one who
simply exhibits X but not Y. This approach may work well in intelligence
analysis, as the lower court said,425 but it certainly shortchanges concerns
about the probity of the evidence. In the end, the trial and appellate opin-
ions in Al-Adahi represent diametrically opposed understandings of the ap-
propriate role of mosaic-type analysis in evidence law generally and in ad-
judicating detainee habeas petitions in particular.
A review of the existing case law in the D.C. Circuit clearly shows a
change in the way the mosaic theory, by whatever name, is now being eval-
uated in the Circuit.426 In addition to Al-Adahi, several other rulings that
4 20 Al-Adahi, 613 F.3d. 1102.
421 Id. at 1104.
422 Id. at 1105.
423 Id. at 1106.
4 24 Id. at 1104-05.
425 Al-Adahi, 2009 WL 2584685, at *5.
426 Benjamin Wittes notes that the pro-detainee rulings by the D.C. district court have provoked a sharp
response over the past two years from the D.C. Circuit: "The law that is emerging from the D.C. Cir-
cuit's reaction is highly favorable to the governments position and represents a dramatic change in the
landscape over a relatively short period of time. This change has affected the bottom line outcome in
several habeas cases, in the sense that petitioners who prevailed under the standards the district judges
were using at the time then saw the D.C. Circuit reevaluate the favorable result." BENJAMIN WITTES ET
AL., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0: THE GUANTANAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 112
(April 2012), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2011/5/guantanamo%/20wittes/05 guantanamo
wittes.pdf
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granted habeas relief initially were overturned on appeal in 2010 and
2011.42 Thus, the D.C. Circuit does not share the district judges' skepti-
cism toward mosaic-based habeas defenses. Of course, the reviewing
court's stance may bring the lower courts to conform to it. In June of 2012,
after the Supreme Court declined to review the D.C. Circuit's denial of ha-
428beas relief to seven Guantanamo detainees, commentators speculated that
the Court would weaken the effect of the Boumediene ruling by leaving the
Circuit to formulate its own, restrictive standards for habeas cases.429 As a
result of these certiorari denials, the D.C. Circuit's endorsement of the gov-
ernment's mosaic approach may well be the final word on mosaics in the
Guantanamo detainee context.
PART IV: THE MOSAIC AS A RESTRICTIVE AND AN EXPANSIVE DEVICE
What entered legal discourse as a heuristic device to describe circum-
stantial evidence has become a powerful executive branch weapon used to
defeat individual rights claims. This article has considered, in the two pre-
ceding Parts, two types of cases where the mosaic theory has been de-
ployed: state secrets and detainee habeas cases. In state secrets cases, the
government deploys the theory restrictively by warning against the "mosa-
ic-making," to use Pozen's phrase,430 that could result from a disclosure of
purportedly secret evidence.43' In habeas cases, the government uses the
mosaic concept expansively by urging a composite view of evidence that
supports classification of detainees as enemy combatants.432
The following table illustrates the types of mosaic applications that can
427 Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2010), rev'd, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Salahi v.
Obama, 710 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2010), rev'd, 625 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F.
Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2009), rev'd, 632 F. 3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746,
747, 760 (2011) (without mentioning "mosaics" explicitly, remands habeas case to district court for "ho-
listic" rather than "atomized" evaluation of evidence).
428 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2739 (2012); Uthman
v. Obama, 637 F.3d. 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2739 (2012); Al-Madhwani v. Obama,
642 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2739 (2012); Almerfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1,
(D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2739 (2012); Al Alwi v. Obama, 653 F.3d II (D.C. Cir. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2739 (2012); Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S.Ct. 2741 (2012); Al Kandari v. U.S., 462 F. App'x I (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2741-42
(2012).
429 Transcript of The Constitution Project & Covington & Burling LLP Discussion: Boumediene's Leg-
acy and the Fate of Guantanamo Detainees (July 17, 2012), available at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Transcript%/ 20from%/o2OPanel%/o20DiscussionBoumediene.pdf.
430 Pozen, supra note 10, at 650.
431 Jd
432 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 527 (2004); see also Azmy, supra note 35, at 532.
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arise in litigation contexts. The mosaic theory can be restrictive, in the
sense that the government's goal is to inhibit "mosaic-making." 433 Alterna-
tively, mosaics can be expansive when they enable the government to offer
a completed mosaic to the court. At the same time, mosaics can be em-
ployed in ways that favor an individual or in ways that favor the govern-
ment. This article has discussed the "restrictive/pro-government" usage
here by focusing on state secrets cases.434  The government purportedly
benefits by preventing someone from constructing a mosaic out of state se-
crets. The "expansive/pro-government" usage is represented by the gov-
ernment's pro-detention arguments, in which a composite of evidence is
presented to justify continued detention. "Expansive/pro-individual" usage
arises in Title VII cases, where an individual plaintiff is permitted to prove
discrimination through a mosaic of circumstantial evidence. Finally, the
"restrictive/pro-individual" usage, although not explicitly documented in
this article, would arise in a case where an individual seeks to fight against
data aggregation, or "knowledge discovery in databases," by which individ-
ual data points could be collected to construct a consumer profile, or sus-
pect profile, more invasive than any of the individual disclosures standing
alone. 435 This concern is documented in the electronic privacy and surveil-
lance literature.436
Table: A Typology of Mosaic Applications
Expansive/Pro-Individual Expansive/Pro-Government
Context: Title VII litigation Context: detainee habeas litigation
Restrictive/Pro-Individual Restrictive/Pro-Government
Context: Challenge to "knowledge Context: state secrets litigation
discovery in database" ("KDD")
433 See, e.g., Ctr. forNat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221, 1226, 1228 (D. Or. 2006); Da-
vid E. Posen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE
L.J. 628, 643 (2005) (quoting Cent. Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178-79 (1985)).
434 See generally United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Crater Corp. v. Lucent Technologies,
Inc., 423 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998); Halkin v.
Helms, 598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.1978); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006);
Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2006); ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp.
2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Al-Haramain, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215; Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(E.D. N.Y. 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006); Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F.
Supp. 2d 66 (D. Conn. 2005).
435 See generally OSCAR H. GANDY, JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION (1993); MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS (2007); TORIN MONAHAN, ED., SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY:
TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2006).
436 See generally GANDY, supra note 435; KUHN, supra note 435; MONAHAN, supra note 435.
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practices
One issue that arises repeatedly in the mosaic-related cases surveyed here
is the quality, or more precisely, the probity of the evidence from which a
given mosaic would be constructed. 43  In the expansive/pro-government
scenario, the mosaic is only as valid as the pieces of evidence that comprise
it. If that evidence is flawed - because it is uncorroborated hearsay, or be-
cause it was produced by torture - then it ought not be used to help con-
struct the larger evidentiary picture. This is seemingly what the judge in the
El Gharani case was concerned about when he questioned the validity of
the pieces comprising the government's mosaic.438  Courts have indicated
that such a limitation would be important;439 they need to make those state-
ments with greater frequency and specificity. To look at a mosaic without
regard for these genetic characteristics is to misuse the concept and invite
illegitimate development of precedent.
Pozen notes that when FOJA denials raise the mosaic theory as part of
their justification, "[t]he mosaic, not the document, becomes the appropriate
unit of risk assessment." 440 This shift of focus is as worrisome in state se-
crets and detention cases as it is in FOJA cases, and perhaps even more so.
Instead of asking whether a particular document was properly denied (even
though FOTA has a presumption of openness) 441, the Bush administration's
approach asked whether a document might undergo changes in character
when viewed through an aggregating prism.442 Attorney General Ashcroft's
directive, departing from the requirement that a "reasonable basis for classi-
fication" was sufficient to justify FOJA denial, both tracks and reflects this
shift in focus from the particular to the aggregate.4 43 Also, the mosaic-level
focus changes whatever probability analysis the court was using, explicitly
or tacitly.44
437 See Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280 (GK), 2009 WL 2584685, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009); Ah-
med v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2009).
438 El Gharani v. Bush, 593 F. Supp. 2d 144, 148 (D.D.C. 2009).
439 See, e.g., id at 148-49.
440 Pozen, supra note 10, at 633.
441 See id. at 635.
442 See Ctr. For Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2003); id at
631.
443 See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to Heads of all Fed. Dep'ts and Agencies
(Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.doi.gov/foia/foia.pdf; see also Pozen, supra note 10, at 647.
444 Pozen criticizes the CNSS case, in particular, for misapprehending the probabilities in the case:
"CNSS's blanket no-disclosure holding therefore vindicated an extreme application of the mosaic theory:
Through the court's delegation, the government prevailed on a mosaic claim with low plausibility, very
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In the two contexts discussed in this article, the move to the "big picture"
might entail additional risks. The fact that a statement is compound hear-
say,445 for example, renders it virtually useless as probative evidence; how-
ever, when viewed from a distance, as part of a pattern, its unreliability
446fades4. It is part of a picture the government offers; it is a detail in a story
that helps to sell the case to the factfinder.
A. Mosaics, Probability Neglect, and the Availability Heuristic
It is, of course, possible that a detainee released following habeas adjudi-
cation could one day harm others through a terrorist act. It is also possible
that a seemingly innocuous piece of information released by the govern-
ment could be used as part of a plan to harm others. Both of these potential
events could reasonably be called low-probability outcomes. However,
both of them are vivid and frightening. People will therefore pay more to
avoid them, notwithstanding the low probability of their occurrence (thus,
the public ignores or miscalculates probability). 447 In addition, people will
be more aware of the potential occurrence because representative images of
the events are so readily available. 448  The former phenomenon is called
"probability neglect;" 44 9 the latter is the "availability heuristic." 450  Cass
Sunstein has described and analyzed both in the context of terrorism. 451 It
requires little reflection to see how both phenomena would be experienced
by people in the United States (or anywhere else in the world) after 9/11.
These effects can influence governmental behavior in a number of ways.
First, government actors take public fears into account when designing and
implementing policies.452 When the public demands action, state officials
cannot afford to ignore those demands. Also, state officials can heighten
fear by emphasizing certain risks.453 Finally, officials can be susceptible to
little support, and even less specificity. Essentially, the court ruled that because the plaintiffs requested
too much information - all of the detainees' names and records - they were not entitled to any infor-
mation, lest disclosure enable adversarial mosaic-making." Pozen, supra note 10, at 660.
445 Al-Adahi v. Obama, No. 05-280 (GK), 2009 WL 2584685, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2009).
446 See Azmy, supra note 35, at 523.
447 Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 124 (2003).
448 Id. at 127-28.
449 Id at 122, 124.
450 Id. at 121, 128.
451 Id. at 121.
4 52 Id. at 129-30 .
453 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 447, at 130-31.
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the same phenomena that are experienced by the general public.4 54 Both
state secrets cases and detainee cases involve a certain iconography of fear
that shapes decisions in a way that does not reflect the actual probabilities
involved. First of all, no probability calculation is given or required in state
secrets cases. Though Reynolds mentions a "reasonable" probability of
danger to national security,455 the mosaic theory renders any probability
calculation very fuzzy or replaces "probability" with "abstract possibil-
ity."456 This substitution works because the prospect of national security
risk is so frightening (before 9/11, and so much more now).
With regard to detention of suspected terrorists, there is a probability cal-
culation embedded in the habeas process: a greater-than-equal probability
of combatant status is required to defeat a habeas petition and keep a peti-
tioner detained.457 However, this calculation is quite different from calcu-
lating the chance that a released detainee will cause harm; in fact, it is sev-
eral causal steps removed from such a calculation. 458 Nonetheless, judges
are still influenced by the vivid and traumatic representation of potential
terrorist attacks. 459 Government attorneys can be the ones who evoke those
460fears4. Judges also exhibit another phenomenon associated with probabil-
ity neglect as Sunstein describes it.461 A person who fears flying will avoid
462
air travel despite the fact that a plane crash is unlikely4. That person
might even know that a crash is unlikely. Nonetheless, a second-order con-
sideration leads the person to avoid flying as well: the wish to avoid feeling
463frightened. Thus, air travel is avoided both because there is a (low) prob-
ability of a crash and because the traveler does not want to feel afraid. Sim-
ilarly, judges could refrain from ruling against the government in habeas
and state secrets cases because they feel the fear generated by the govern-
ment's presentation or they do not want to face the public's (fear-based)
negative reaction to an anti-government decision. The vague and specula-
tive nature of mosaic-type claims facilitates these first- and second-order
reactions, thereby helping to produce decisions shaped by probability ne-
4 54 See id. at 123.
455 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
456 See Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Pozen, supra note 10, at 672.
457 See Azmy, supra note 35, at 518.
4 58 Id. at 519-20.
459 Pozen supra note 10, at 631, 646, 652, 678.
4 60 See id at 658-660.
461 Sunstein, supra note 447, at 122.
462 7d
463 Id. at 132.
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glect and the availability heuristic. 464
B. States of Exception and the Emergency Constitution
In considering mosaics as they are used in information control and pre-
ventive detention, I focused on two types of cases with obvious implica-
tions for individual liberties. Of course, these case types are linked in the
sense that both of them have become crucial and recurring sites of contesta-
tion over the precise location of the dividing line between state power and
individual rights. As aspects of the war on terror, they invite questions
about the normative status of certain state practices within our political life
and constitutional tradition.
Since 9/11, commentators frequently turn to the notion of the "state of
exception," which originates with the political theorist Carl Schmitt, to ar-
ticulate the problem of emergency powers.465 This pertains to claims by the
sovereign to act outside the constraints of the existing law in exceptional
466
situations4. Often, the exception claim is provoked by an unusual state of
affairs that threatens the very existence of the polity itself.467 The problem,
of course, is how to return to normal political conditions once a state of ex-
ception has been invoked. One commentator has warned about the dangers
of letting the executive decide when the exception begins and ends, claim-
ing that "when exceptional circumstances arise justifying actions taken un-
der the rule of necessity, and when the executive has the authority to decide
when those circumstances exist, there is a risk that such exceptions may be-
come increasingly normal."468
In a well-known argument about "the emergency constitution," Bruce
Ackerman offers his take on this problem.469 Because he notes the effects
464 Id. at 128 (noting that although the availability heuristic and probability neglect are distinct con-
cepts, it may be difficult, in practice to determine which one is actually driving behavior).
465 See generally, Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); David
Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Constitution?, 7 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2005 (2006); Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and Existential Politics, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
235 (2007); Trevor Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533
(2007); Deborah Pearl stein, Form and Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1549 (2009); Mark Rahdert, Double-Checking Executive Emergency Power: Lessons from Hamdi and
Hamdan, 80 TEMP L. REV. 451 (2007).
466 See Ackerman, supra note 465, at 1037.
467 Jd.
468 Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity; Torture and the State of Constitutional Culture, 61
SMU L. REV. 221, 230 (2008).
469 See generally Ackerman, supra note 465.
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of emergency measures on individuals (he treats detention as a specific ex-
ample), 470 his work is pertinent here. Writing post-9/11 about the problem
of future global, catastrophic terror threats, he asks whether the U.S. Consti-
tution, which says little about emergency powers, could respond adequate-
ly.471 Ackerman thinks that a new constitutional design, incorporating
472
emergency powers, is needed. The existing structure provides powers
that are capable of addressing two kinds of threats - crime and war - but
terrorist attacks are a different kind of threat, requiring a different re-
sponse. 473 Ackerman is aware of the well-founded fear that a permanent
necessity regime could result from the granting of these constitutionally-
based emergency powers. However, Ackerman argues that the powers
could be cabined by certain structural limits, such as a "supermajoritarian
escalator,"474 where an ever-increasing legislative supermajority would be
required for each extension of the timeframe of emergency powers.
Ackerman does not think that the "common law cycle" 475 of judicial deci-
sion-making is sufficiently responsive to resolve the problems raised by ter-
476
rorist-created emergencies. He mentions the Japanese internment cases
as an example of when the courts "got it wrong." 477
It seems that Ackerman would take issue with the argument that the Su-
preme Court did, in fact, perform an important role in managing the balance
between Rule of Law and effective anti-terror policy post-9/1 1. Azmy
shows that the Court did this by opening the district courts to detainees' ha-
beas petitions and consequently encouraging the development of common
law standards of adjudication for those petitions. 478 Ackerman does, in fact,
see a role for the courts: as "backstop" against executive overreach at the
"micro" level. 4 9 In other words, the courts are better able to adjudicate at
this level, deciding the claims of individuals (e.g., detainees and infor-
mation-seeking members of the public) within the bounds of the emergency
regime. He is less comfortable, though, with the courts refereeing macro
conflicts involving challenges to the legitimacy of the emergency powers
470 See generally id.
471 Jd at 1030-31.
472 Jd. at 1031.
473 d. at 1032.
474 d. at 1047.
475 Ackerman, supra note 465, at 1042.
476 Jd.
477 d.
478 Azmy, supra note 35, at 514.
479 Ackerman, supra note 465, at 1086.
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480the executive is using.
Kim Scheppele views the emergency powers argument with skepti-
cism. 481 She reminds us that Ackerman wrote in a time when the possibility
for calm and deliberate reflection had passed.482 We are aware of one such
catastrophic emergency even as we anticipate how to deal with the next.
But Scheppele's sense of the actual experience of governments claiming
and using emergency powers is different. There are, she argues,
[a]lso clear tendencies for emergency powers to exceed the depth and duration
of the threats that brought them into being. The United States itself has certain-
ly experienced over its history the temptations of emergency rule and also per-
mitted extraordinary presidential powers long after the ends of the wars that
provided the rationales for using emergency powers in the first place.48
Scheppele concludes by citing a passage from Ex Parte Milligan, the
Civil War-era case where the Supreme Court invalidated President Lin-
484
coln's death sentence for a Confederate sympathizer. The case stands as
a rebuke of emergency executive actions during wartime. Because the
courts were open and functioning at the time and place where Milligan's ac-
tions occurred, Lincoln's order that Milligan be tried by military tribunal
was illegal.48 Ackerman might say that Milligan is an example of macro
adjudication occurring after the fact in a period of reflection and adjust-
ment. After all, Milligan was decided after Lincoln's death and the end of
486the Civil War. Ackerman does not think courts should be charged with
evaluating executive emergency powers in real time, as the emergency un-
folds, but he does not object to macro-level review as hindsight judgment,
when things have calmed down.48 Thus, Milligan's repudiation of emer-
gency power might not bother him. Nonetheless, the Milligan court made
two important points in its opinion: that the Constitution as written is capa-
ble of addressing emergencies, 488 and that the Court itself stood ready to
perform its role in protecting individuals against illegitimately deployed ex-
ecutive power.
480 7d
481 See Kim Scheppele, We Are All Post-9/II Now, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 607 (2006).
482 Id. at 607-08.
483 Id at 613.
484 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
485 d
486 d.
487 Ackerman, supra note 465, at 1066, 1074.
488 Milligan, 71 U.S. 2.
489 Id. See generally Kutz, supra note 465 (noting concern that the state might decide prematurely that
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The historical record should be considered even more closely. Justice
Brennan believed that historical evidence showed that courts had, in fact,
managed to perform their institutional role in times of crisis without imped-
ing governance or imperiling order.490 In explaining the importance of the
Bill of Rights as part of a system of ordered and protected liberties, Bren-
nan cited the fears of some pro-executive commentators who warned that
courts would give too much weight to individual liberties and not enough to
political exigency.4 9' Upon examining what courts have actually done
when the nation was under threat,492 Brennan concluded that those fears
seem unfounded. Brennan notes that courts have more often behaved con-
servatively: they have "been too willing to compromise civil liberties when
the authorities deemed it expedient to do so."493 In fact, Brennan thought,
"in retrospect, more vigorous enforcement of the Bill of Rights during times
of national security crisis would not have been damaging." 494 The problem,
then, has not been too much solicitude for individual rights, but not enough.
Beneath the problem of courts' institutional (or historically-assessed) ca-
pability to adjudicate macro-level conflicts in real time (that is, to manage
the executive's emergency powers), there is a fundamental theoretical ques-
tion raised by the emergency powers problem: What is the legal status of
the "state of exception"? Does it fall "inside or outside" the legal order, in
the words of one commentator?495 There is a scholarly dispute on this
496point, which is aptly summarized in the literature of emergency powers.
But in concrete historical actions by the executive branch, state actors pro-
491
vide an answer of their own4. In order to preserve at least the appearance
of legitimacy, the executive will seek to justify departures from the "ordi-
nary" limits of state force. 498 Detention and coercive interrogation are two
of the more stark examples of extraordinary state practices, and they are ex-
plained as lawful and legitimate state actions.499 One example of a state-
ment purportedly legalizing such actions was the Bush administration's as-
surance that it was treating detainees humanely even though the Geneva
the point of existential threat has been reached and then (prematurely) declare a state of emergency).
490 William J. Brennan, Why Have a Billof Rights?, 26 VAL. U.L REV. 1 (1991).
491 Jd. at 32.
492 Jd. at 7.
493 Id at 15.
494 d.
495 See Dyzenhaus, supra note 465.
496 Jd.
4 97 d. at 2019.
4 98 d at 2015.
499 d. at 2024.
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Convention's standards would not be applied to them.soo Thus, a promise
of humane treatment was offered to suggest that rule of law was still operat-
ing. Of course, once the legal requirements are stripped away, what re-
mains is conduct by sufferance, rather than conduct by legal obligation.
One thing that the Hamdan Court did by holding the executive to the stand-
ards of the Uniform Code of Military Justice'ol (and by extension, to the
Geneva Convention and the Law of War incorporated therein),5 02 was to af-
firm that rule of law continued to operate even in the course of the "war on
terror." 0 3 What about after suspension is actually, formally proclaimed?
On this point, Dyzenhaus emphasizes that once suspension occurs, claims
of legality are simply window-dressing.504 As he puts it, "law cannot effec-
tively enshrine a distinction between constitutional dictatorship and dicta-
torship. They appear to be vain attempts to find a role for law while at the
same time conceding that law has no role."o Carl Schmitt might read this
statement as a realistic acknowledgment of the prerogative of sovereignty,
but Dyzenhaus seems to mean it as a criticism of the willingness of some to
believe that rule of law survives suspension.
Mosaic claims will arise in times of crisis. They have proliferated in the
two national security-related areas considered here: detention of suspected
terrorists and protection of state secrets. The decisional law in these areas
continues to develop as courts are presented with new disputes to resolve.
Thus, in the end, common law rules fashioned by the federal courts can be
important sources of fundamental justice. In the case of the mosaic theory,
the courts must correct an injustice of their own making. By importing the
mosaic theory into the federal common law of habeas and evidentiary privi-
lege, the courts have created an unmanageable doctrine whose expansion
facilitates executive overreach. They can tame the doctrine, but they must
be willing to do so despite executive insistence that its unfettered applica-
tion is necessary for protecting national security.
CONCLUSION
The use of the mosaic theory as an analytical tool in individual rights
500 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 FED. REG.
57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
501 Hadan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 557 (2006).
502 d
503 d
504 See Dyzenhaus, supra note 465, at 2017.
5 05 Id. at 2017.
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cases has shaped case law in troubling ways. It is far easier to for the exec-
utive branch to accomplish information control (via state secrets assertion)
and continued detention (via contesting habeas petitions) with the mosaic
theory available for use than without it. In other words, it facilitates nega-
tive outcomes in terms of individual liberties. Wittes suggests that use of
the term "mosaic" in government legal arguments "poses no inherent con-
troversy," as it simply a "metaphor for recognition of . . . latent probative
value."506 This might be true were it not for the fact that the mosaic theory
has affected the substantive evaluation of evidenceo and in turn has shaped
the evidentiary record in the types of cases considered here. As a device for
structuring legal narratives, it can be said that the mosaic concept "poses no
inherent controversy,"' 0 but as part of the grammar of executive power, it
is (and should be) controversial. In particular, it allows incompetent evi-
dence to form the basis for habeas denial, and it allows public, unclassified
information to remain secret. The reversals of district court decisions that
had criticized the mosaic theory are not explained merely by science or log-
ic, but rather by a deferential view of executive action. Deference has been
the rule rather than the exception in state secrets jurisprudence if one views
the sixty-year history of the doctrine. Similarly, in detention-related rulings
following 9/11, the circuits deferred to the executive - in material witness
cases,'o, in challenges to use of military tribunalsso - until the Supreme
Court handed down Hamdi,sit Rasul,5 Hamdan,5/3 and Boumediene.514
What is troubling, then, is not the government's use of the mosaic as a nar-
rative strategy but rather the facilitation of weak legal claims that bolster
executive power. Courts must resist the government's demands that evi-
dentiary standards be loosened to allow the executive to pursue its institu-
tional functions. For this abdication of the courts' role in our system of
checks and balances threatens to throw the separated powers out of balance.
506 WITTES, supra note 35, at 113.
507 Pozen, supra note 10, at 631.
508 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PROJECT ON LAW AND SECURITY THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION 2.0
(2012).
509 See, e.g., United States. v. Awadallah, 349 F. 3d 42 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 861
(2005).
510 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 415 F. 3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
511 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
512 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
513 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
514 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229(2008).
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